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The left-wing insurgency in Peru waged by the Shining Path, or Sendero Luminoso (SL), 
and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal launched by the Communist Party of Nepal 
(CPN(M)) have impacted their respective states and societies. Despite similarities in the 
social, economic, and political grievances in the two states, the insurgencies had 
dramatically different trajectories and outcomes. The SL leadership did not exploit 
political opportunities effectively, and when its leader was captured, the SL collapsed. In 
contrast, the CPN(M) leadership applied pragmatic approaches and exploited political 
opportunities. The CPN(M) entered into mainstream politics and even won the general 
election of 2008. This thesis argues that SL leadership developed around a cult of 
personality, applied a dogmatic military approach, and adopted a violent approach in 
“elimination of class enemies,” whereas the CPN(M) leadership style developed around 
moderate communists, applied “progressive ideology,” and embraced the grievances of 
the indigenous people. Whatever the trajectory, insurgencies have demonstrated a 
potential threat affecting state and society. Furthermore, given that terrorism is 
transnational and that insurgents engage in terrorist activities, it is imperative for such 
armed struggles to be ended expeditiously and effectively. This thesis highlights the 
importance of a political approach as an important means for ending an insurgency 
successfully.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Revolutionary wars take place when the “government is distant—politically, 
socially, and even geographically—from a significant counterelite.”1 In particular, armed 
rebellions inspired by Marxist principles are commonly called leftist insurgencies. Their 
main goal is to overthrow the existing political and social system. Many leftist 
insurgencies employ the strategy of people’s war conceived by Mao Tse Tung, a Chinese 
strategist. The Maoist strategy consists of three stages: a strategic defense, a strategic 
stalemate, and a strategic offense.2 Some scholars contend that leftist insurgencies 
employing these strategies disappeared after the Cold War. However, in the late twentieth 
century and early part of the twenty-first century, some countries were faced with the 
challenge of responding to insurgents who employed the Maoist strategy for inciting 
political change.   
During the final years of the Cold War, Peru witnessed a left-wing insurgency by 
the Shining Path, Sendero Luminoso (SL), to capture state power. The insurgency began 
in 1980, just as Peru was undergoing a political transition after 17 years of autocratic 
rule. During the 1970s and 1980s, the living standard of the peasants in rural areas had 
declined, creating an environment of severe poverty and hopelessness, which led to a 
violent conflict resulting in the death of 69,000 people. However, after the capture of its 
leader in 1992, the Shining Path was doomed.3  
Similarly, a few countries in South Asia have faced left-wing insurgencies after 
the Cold War. Among them, Nepal, a small land-locked country, has witnessed the most 
1Samuel P. Huntington, “Patterns of Violence in World Politics,” in Conflict after the Cold War: 
Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 558. 
2Mahendra Lawoti, “Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” in The Maoist 
Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty First Century, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari 
(New York: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, 2010), 13. 
3Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist 
Campaign, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 18‒19. 
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successful Maoist insurgency in recent decades.4 The Communist Party of Nepal, 
CPN(M), led this insurgency in February 1996 following a transition period in the 1990s, 
when democracy was established after 30 years of autocratic rule. Grievances had 
mounted in Nepal due to the complex social and economic disparity between rich and 
poor. However, after the death of 13,000 people and the subsequent signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in November 2006, the conflict ended with the 
CPN(M) joining the political mainstream.5   
Before the start of these insurgencies, Nepal and Peru faced similar political, 
social, and economic challenges. Both countries underwent left-wing insurgencies that 
grew in strength and effectively challenged the central government. Both organizations 
adopted Mao’s doctrine of the people’s war, and both insurgencies lasted for almost the 
same period—ten years for Nepal and nearly 12 years for Peru. Thus, the major research 
question is: “Despite the similarity in the conditions of political, economic, and social 
challenges in Peru and Nepal, the adaptation of Mao’s strategy by both insurgent groups, 
and the duration of the insurgencies, why did Nepal’s insurgency end with a political 
settlement, whereas Peru’s insurgency did not?”  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
Many theorists of revolution believe that transitions from authoritarianism to 
democratic regimes decrease the likelihood of armed insurgency as democracy is 
supposed to diffuse violence by transforming such tendencies into non-violent conflicts 
through electoral politics and non-violent protests.6 However, the insurgencies in Peru 
and Nepal have challenged this premise as both countries faced armed conflicts after 
achieving democracy. Researchers can further explore why violence erupts during a 
transition to democracy, but that is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
This thesis explores how the internal dynamics of a state and external factors, 
such as international actors, shape an insurgent leader’s decision making. Communists 
4Rabindra Mishra, “India’s Role in Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency,” Asian Survey 44, no. 5 (2004): 627. 
5Lawoti, “Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 4‒12. 
6Ibid., 3. 
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traditionally focus on class inequalities; however, the CPN(M) exploited the political 
opportunity provided by rudimentary political institutions and focused on ethnic 
grievances more prominently to strengthen their organization into a formidable one. In 
the wake of countermeasures after 9/11, the CPN(M) leadership drew the attention of the 
international community, which placed the CPN(M) on the terrorist watchlist. Thus, this 
study facilitates an understanding of the role of internal and external dynamics in shifting 
organizational goals.  
Leftist insurgencies continue to pose a serious concern to both domestic and 
foreign communities since many of these insurgencies use terror tactics. India is currently 
experiencing a left-wing insurgency in the form of the Naxalite Movement. The former 
Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, stated on many occasions that the Maoist 
insurgency was the most serious internal security threat for India.7 To address this 
insurgent threat successfully, India and other states need to understand the reasons why 
the CPN(M) made a compromise in Nepal. At the same time, states need to acknowledge 
how the CPN(M) changed the politics of Nepal and the environment in which the future 
government must work. Though the CPN(M) was unsuccessful in establishing a 
communist regime, the party initiated other changes—abolition of the monarchy, election 
of a constituent assembly to draft a new democratic constitution, and a process for 
adopting federalism.   
This thesis facilitates an understanding of how such insurgencies may deviate 
from their goals and thus cause a state to face new non-violent challenges. Furthermore, 
this research investigates another mystery: the rise of a communist revolution in Nepal in 
the twenty-first century when communist regimes were falling. The Maoist conflict 
expanded despite an unfavorable international climate following the Cold War. After the 
Cold War, the world witnessed a collapse of communist ideology due to the breakdown 
of Soviet Union. However, only a few countries faced left-wing insurgencies. This study 
explores how the CPN(M) was able to survive under such conditions.   
7John Harriss, “What Is Going on in India’s ‘Red Corridor’? Questions about India’s Maoist 
Insurgency,” Literature Review, Pacific Affairs 84, no. 2 (2011): 310.  
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Both the insurgencies in Peru and Nepal used terrorism as a tactic, before and 
after the Cold War. Many domestic insurgencies continue to draw important lessons from 
terrorist organizations due to the correlation between them: “Terrorism and insurgency 
are not the same thing; but they are cousins, distinguished by the strength of the 
movement and differences in the targeting.”8 Given the entangled nature of terrorism and 
insurgency, this thesis does not make a clear demarcation between insurgency and 
terrorism, but assumes terrorist organizations devise new tactics that insurgents follow. 
Thus, it may guide other researchers who attempt to devise a clear-cut demarcation 
between insurgency and terrorism.  
Lastly, since most terrorist groups do not negotiate,9 why did the CPN(M) do so? 
Many scholars posit that conflicts come to an end and negotiations take place when there 
is a “hurting stale mate”—a situation in which both the state and the insurgent group can 
neither win nor accept loss. Nepal’s insurgency may be considered as having reached a 
hurting stalemate. The CPN(M) entered into its first round of negotiations with the 
government in 2001, before the mobilization of the Nepalese Army. The second was in 
2003. By contrast, the Shining Path never opted for negotiations. Thus, this study 
explores the timing of a negotiation in light of the interests of both the state and the rebel 
leadership. It also highlights lessons for countries facing insurgencies to enable them to 
formulate counterinsurgency measures.    
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Overall, the literature on socio-revolutionary movements in Peru and Nepal has 
focused on the causes, motivations, and methods of insurgency. The literature explains 
the prevailing conditions that led to the rise of the insurgencies and the effects of the 
insurgencies. The available literature also explains that both insurgent groups used terror 
tactics, and both states used repressive counterinsurgency measures to curtail the 
insurgency. The available literature largely depicts the outcome of the insurgencies in 
terms of success or failure. Manuel Ruben Abimael Guzman Reynoso, commonly known 
8Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 147. 
9Ibid., 42. 
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as “Guzman,” led the Shining Path, and his organization is seen as a failure, whereas 
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, known as “Prachanda,” led the CPN(M) and his organization is 
observed as a success. However, what is missing among the literature is the rationale 
behind the shift in Prachanda’s thinking, which contributed to this success. The literature 
also does not consider Guzman’s unyielding approach, which contributed to the failure of 
the Shining Path.   
Audrey Kurth Cronin in her book How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the 
Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns looks historically at how terrorist campaigns 
end, and portrays Guzman as an autocratic and adamant leader. Cronin states that 
Guzman consolidated his power by expelling or executing dissenters and engaged in 
highly individualistic and personalized leadership. Guzman never negotiated, and 
according to her, most terrorist groups do not choose to negotiate. She adds that groups 
that negotiate have a longer average life span. Her analysis correlates groups’ ages with 
their propensities to engage in negotiations. However, her theory may not seem to 
address the case of CPN(M), which negotiated and had a shorter life span. Moreover, 
Cronin did not relate groups’ tactics, ideologies, and regional locations to the longevity of 
a terrorist organization.10  
Jeremy M. Weinstein in his book Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent 
Violence claims that “initial endowments accessible to rebel leaders shape and constrain 
their strategies.”11 His main argument is that rebel groups that emerge in a resource 
wealthy environment or with external support tend to commit a higher level of 
indiscriminate violence than groups that emerge in a resource poor environment. 
Weinstein argues that rebels in a resource wealthy environment will attract opportunistic 
individuals, whereas rebels in a resource poor environment are forced to rely on “social 
endowments.” In the case of the CPN(M), which emerged in a resource poor 
environment, the theory does seem to fit; however, the leadership seems to exploit both 
10Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 19. 
11Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 11. 
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opportunity and social endowments. His argument that a resource poor environment 
builds a long-term relationship with civilians can be counter-argued in the case of 
Shining Path. According to Weinstein, the inception of an insurgency, and the attraction 
of people to the rebel group, shape rebel strategies. Weinstein argues that ideological 
commitment was central to membership in the Shining Path, whereas “divergent 
practice” was the focus of Prachanda’s leadership.12 However, an examination of what 
led the Maoist leadership to indulge in divergent practice is missing.   
Jo-Marie Burt in her book Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru: 
Silencing Civil Society provides an analysis of the social, political, and economic crisis of 
Peru during the 1980s.The book furthers the understanding of political violence and its 
impact on civil society and democratic governance. The book provides insight about how 
autocratic leaders can exploit the legacies of political violence. After the Shining Path 
grew in strength, its authoritarian leader and the state head were in a contest for 
consolidating power at the cost of the civil society. The Shining Path never planned to 
join hands with the democratic-left group.13 The acts of alienation and their effects on the 
Shining Path require analysis, as alienating other rebel groups was counter-productive for 
the Shining Path. The effects of the alienation slowly diminished popular support.  
Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati in A Kingdom under Siege: Nepal’s Maoist 
Insurgency, 1996 to 2003 analyze the root and proximate causes that gave rise to the 
Maoist insurgency. They argue that state’s neglect caused the people’s war, and explore a 
detailed account of the chronological development of the insurgency until 2003.14 
However, the book does not consider the challenges that Maoists faced after the 
deployment of the Nepalese Army. According to Thapa, the organization collected funds 
internally, but as the Maoist organization expanded, how the organization was sustained 
is not explained. Furthermore, the role of international players after 9/11 seems to be 
missing. 
12Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 32. 
13Jo-Marie Burt, Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru: Silencing Civil Society (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 10. 
14Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati, A Kingdom under Siege: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 
2003 (Kathmandu: The Printhouse, 2003), 181. 
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Mahendra Lawati and Anup K. Pahari in their book The Maoist Insurgency in 
Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century argue that the Maoist conflict was more of 
an ethnic conflict. They claim that the Maoist conflict was an amalgamation of classic 
communist ideology of class struggle, which gained momentum and became effective 
only after the CPN(M) exploited ethnic identity issues. During the conflict, the Maoists 
did not use violence indiscriminately. They further argue that the “absence of lootable 
natural resources” turned out to be a blessing for the CPN(M).15 Krishna B. Bhattachan 
suggests that the Maoist conflict was an ethnic conflict because of two indicators—
political opportunities and the indigenous organizational strength.16 The literature discuss 
the leadership adopting ethnic lines as an opportunity, but do not explain why it became 
essential to shift the class struggle to ethnic lines.  
S. D. Munni in Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace 
analyzes the context, dynamics, and key players that have shaped the insurgency and 
state politics. Munni portrays Prachanda as a leader who wanted to unite the leftist 
organizations and is believed to have facilitated the merger of India’s People’s War 
Group (PWG) and the Maoist Coordination of Committee (MCC).17 Furthermore, he 
states that the Maoists were caught in an internal conflict between the two approaches: a 
revolutionary struggle to achieve an ultimate ideological goal, and a pragmatic and 
gradual movement towards the ultimate goal. The Maoists adopted the gradual movement 
because of national and international pressure. However, the CPN(M), which had grown 
in strength, accepted the gradual approach not only due to national and international 
pressure. The work needs further analysis on the CPN(M)’s willingness to compromise.  
Thomas A. Marks and David Scott Peter argue that structural factors like poverty, 
economy, culture, and politics were not strong grounds for insurgency in both countries. 
Rather, they argue that the principal actors—the insurgents and government—were the 
15Lawoti, “Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 12. 
16Krishna B. Bhattachan, “Ethnopolitics and Ethnodevelopment: An Emerging Paradigm in Nepal ‒ 
with a Postscript,” in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990, eds. 
Mahendra Lawati and Susan Hangen (New York: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, 2013), 43. 
17S. D. Munni, “Bringing the Maoists down from the Hills,” in Nepal in Transition: From People’s 
War to Fragile Peace, eds. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 321. 
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main cause for the initiation and expansion of the insurgency. The literature further 
argues that the inappropriate state response by Peru and Nepal caused the Shining Path 
and the Maoist insurgencies, respectively, to incorporate terrorism in their campaign to 
form a counter state. In such situations, terrorists are interchangeably used with 
insurgents. The literature portrays the leadership of both groups as educated and 
charismatic and further states that both leaders saw themselves as “ideologically pure.” 
However, it can be argued that Prachanda’s actions were never ideologically pure, and 
furthermore, the literature does not discuss both the leader’s pragmatism in dealing with 
new challenges.18  
According to the empirical tests conducted by S. Brock Blomberg, Khusrav 
Gaibulloev, and Todd Sandler, terrorist groups “fare better if they are larger in size, 
diversify their attack modes, and are animated by religiosity rather than a secular political 
goal.”19 They argue that over the years, there has been a shift from nationalists/separatists 
to leftists, and then to the religious fundamentalists, who have dominated since 1990s. So 
why did the Maoist insurgency, which was not a religious fundamentalist movement, turn 
out victorious in the elections after the conflict?   
Sean DeBlieck argues that Maoism had inspired regions in South Asia, including 
Nepal, as Maoism employs tactically effective methods, launches from political 
organizations that are prone to extreme schisms, and targets rural people that are 
economically and politically weak. He argues that Maoism is malleable and so claims 
that the CPN(M) adapted to the changing environment willingly.20 The adaptation to the 
changing environment may not just be willingness, but it is also a necessary means for 
survival due to the challenges.  
18 Thomas A. Marks and David Scott Palmer, “Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics: 
Comparing Peru and Nepal,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 13, no. 2 (2005): 91‒116, doi: 
10.1080/09662840500347280. 
19S. Brock Blomberg, Khusrav Gaibulloev, and Todd Sandler, “Terrorist Group Survival: Ideology, 
Tactics, and Base of Operations,” Public Choice 149 (2011): 441‒463.  
20Sean DeBlieck, “Why Mao? Maoist Insurgencies in India and Nepal,” Peace Conflict and 
Development Issue 9 (July 2006): 1‒37. 
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS  
Insurgent groups use terror tactics and so pose a major threat to a state. A state 
needs to address the threat in a most effective way, but with a minimum loss of human 
lives. Peru and Nepal, as this thesis shows, witnessed a vast difference in the magnitude 
of the loss of human lives. This was due to the variation in the tactics of both the 
insurgent groups and the government forces of Peru and Nepal. Both the insurgent groups 
performed acts of terrorism right from the start of their campaigns, and both groups were 
described as terrorists at different points during their campaigns. The U.S. Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines insurgency as “the 
organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to 
overthrow or force change of a governing authority.”21 Similarly, the dictionary defines 
terrorism as “the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce 
governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other 
ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political.”22  
Again, according to a leading terrorism expert, Martha Crenshaw, a terrorist 
organization’s goal is to challenge the legitimacy of the existing political and social 
structure by calling for a redistribution of power.23 She further adds that such a group 
uses violence to achieve its goal. Thus, looking at the definitions, the common factor is 
the use of political violence. Since both the insurgent groups used political violence to 
fulfill their goals, their campaigns should not be strictly defined in terms of insurgency. 
As discussed earlier, insurgency and terrorism are inter-related; the insurgencies in this 
study need to be viewed as acts of terrorism as well.  
As groups turn to terrorism, the groups’ organizational effectiveness depends on 
the leader’s rationale regarding the use of resources, opportunities, and threats, and on the 
21U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 8, 2010, as amended 
through September 15, 2011): 165. 
22Ibid., 342. 
23Martha Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism,” Orbis 
(1985): 466. 
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decision to react.24 During their campaigns, such groups are likely to face challenges, 
which are in turn contingent on the internal and external environmental factors. However, 
the magnitude of the factors may be different. Thus, the organizations’ adaptation to the 
various challenges caused a variation in the organizational effects of the two 
insurgencies. 
The Shining Path met challenges and reacted in a more coercive manner. It is 
generally argued that if the insurgent is confronted by powerful counterinsurgents, then 
the insurgent “has no recourse but to wait until his opponent is weakened by some 
internal or external crisis.”25 However, this was not the case with the Shining Path, which 
was entangled in indiscriminate killings of non-combatants. This led to confrontation 
with the civil population.  
Also, during the Shining Path’s campaign, another rebel group called the Tupac 
Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) existed for a common objective of destroying 
the standing regime.26 The Shining Path could have gained if it had formed a coalition 
with MRTA or other left-wing parties. However, the Shining Path never tried to form an 
alliance with a group that had similar objectives, rather it confronted the MRTA. The 
Shining Path leadership never opted for negotiation, as ideology remained the center of 
its politics. The group believed in a dogmatic military approach to overthrow the 
incumbent regime, as Guzman adopted an authoritarian way of making decisions.  
By contrast, the CPN(M) seemed to exploit available opportunities in trying to 
achieve organizational effectiveness. The CPN(M) waged a people’s war during a 
transition period, when the state institutions were still incipient and could not fully 
address the expectations of the people. During the people’s war, the Maoists avoided 
indiscriminate violence. Also, the communist revolution occurred when there was an 
unfavorable international environment after the demise of Soviet Union and the fall of 
24Crenshaw, “Organizational Approach,” 465–467. 
25David Galula, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” in Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on 
Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 580. 
26Gordon H. McCormick, Sharp Dressed Men: Peru’s Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (R-
4276) (Arlington, VA: RAND, 1993), 1.  
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Berlin Wall in 1989. Jack Snyder states, “Liberalism had triumphed over its two 
ideological competitors in the twentieth century, communism and fascist nationalism, and 
no new challenges were in sight.”27 So, how did the insurgency sustain itself without 
external support or the state’s natural resources? This thesis explains that though the 
conflict initially started as an inequality dispute between the feudal class and the landless, 
the class conflict could not gain momentum. The CPN(M) sought an alternate strategy 
along ethnic lines that was gaining momentum during the period.  
The CPN(M) sought negotiations as a tool to exploit the situation to its advantage. 
The willingness of the CPN(M) for a compromise was an important factor for the Maoists 
to negotiate. After the CPN(M) started facing a set-back with the deployment of the 
Nepalese Army (NA) and the consequences of 9/11, the CPN(M) tried to take the 
opportunity of forming an alliance with other political parties in order to alienate the 
monarch, under whose command was the army. The switchover of strategies was possible 
because the leadership cell of the CPN(M) had national-level political experience, which 
supported the decision making. The CPN(M)’s readiness to negotiate did settle the 
conflict by a political compromise, as it is principally and practically accepted that 
“political power is the undisputed boss” over the military power.28  
The rebel leaders’ decision making is shaped by many aforementioned factors. 
However, it depends on the rationality of the leaders to accept the available options, 
which results in the variation of the outcome. Thus, my hypothesis is that the outcomes of 
the two insurgencies differed because the CPN(M) leadership was more pragmatic in 
managing organizational resources by exploiting available opportunities, whereas the 
Shining Path leadership was rigid and restricted to its ideology, thus missing political 
opportunities. 
27Jack Snyder, “Nationalist Elite Persuasion in Democratizing States,” in From Voting to Violence: 
Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W.W Norton and Company, 2000), 16. 
28Galula, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 589. 
 11 
                                                 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis employs a comparative study to determine the rationale behind the 
respective leadership’s decisions related to managing organizational resources, which 
caused the variation in the outcomes of the conflicts. The focus of this comparative study 
is Peru’s Shining Path insurgency and Nepal’s Maoist insurgency, led by the CPN(M). 
First, the study provides background to both insurgencies to provide the reader a 
comparison of the settings. Then, the thesis compares the leadership in both insurgencies 
and the approaches they adopted toward organizational resources. Variables such as 
leadership, ideology, and popular support will be analyzed as part of the organizational 
resources.  
Also, during the research, the effect of internal and external factors on the 
organizational resources of both groups is examined. As both groups were deemed 
terrorists at a certain point, the thesis refers to many sources pertaining to terrorism. As 
outlined earlier, insurgency and terrorism have a correlation; thus, this thesis at times 
discusses them interchangeably. The research is drawn from primary and secondary 
sources: scholarly journals, books, government reports, newspapers for this purpose.  
F. THESIS OUTLINE 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I covers the background, the 
research question and hypothesis, and the significance of the study. This chapter also 
includes a literature review. Chapter II deals with the Shining Path. This chapter explores 
the possible grievances that caused the insurgency and describes the SL leadership 
approach, ideological objectives, and popular support. Chapter III deals with the 
CPN(M). This chapter also explores the possible grievances that caused the insurgency 
and describes the CPN(M) leadership approach, ideological objectives, and popular 
support. Chapter IV makes a comparative analysis of the two leadership approaches to 
demonstrate that CPN(M) leadership was adaptive in managing its organizational 
resources, whereas the Shining Path leadership, which was based on personality cult, was 
adamant in ideology and coercive towards the population. Chapter V concludes the thesis 
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with findings of the analysis to draw key lessons to recommend for a state’s effective 
counterinsurgency measures.  
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II. SHINING PATH (SENDERO LUMINOSO)  
Insurgencies have posed increasingly complex problems to state and society. 
From the insurgents’ perspective, their desire to restructure a state may be analyzed as an 
act of political violence to vent their grievances. This chapter will examine the emergence 
and expansion of political violence in Peru. It will deal with the political, economic, and 
social grievances that Peru witnessed before the SL’s campaign. Furthermore, the chapter 
will demonstrate how such challenges paved way for the emergence of the SL 
insurgency, which was led by the SL leadership by initiating a self-proclaimed people’s 
war. People’s war, which was adopted in the lines of Mao’s protracted warfare, impacted 
the state and society.  
As noted in Chapter I, in 1980, the SL initiated a people’s war against the 
Peruvian state to establish a “new democracy.” Some journalists and academics described 
the SL as a “dogmatic, uncompromising, and vicious movement rejecting any option 
other than violent revolution.”29 The leader of the SL, Guzman, had so much authority in 
the organization that he could tailor the movement according to his wishes, but he was 
reluctant to follow a political approach. His movement of violence and coercion 
provoked resistance that could not be suppressed. After 12 years of violent conflict, the 
movement that had turned out to be the “world’s deadliest revolutionary movement,”30 
collapsed with the capture of its leader in 1992.   
A few critical variables of insurgency are considered minimum prerequisites for a 
successful insurgency. The study of such variables will facilitate understanding the SL’s 
leadership approach. In this chapter, SL’s application of some of the variables, which are 
organizational resources, such as leadership, ideology, and popular support, will be 
described to explain how the SL leadership centered on one individual, adapted a fixed 
violent ideology, and relinquished popular support. The study of the SL would be 
incomplete without first considering the history of the emergence of the SL in Peru. 
29 James Ron, “Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso’s Tactical Escalation,” Journal of 
Peace Research 38, no. 5 (September 2001): 572, http://www.jstor.org/stable/424776. 
30 Marks and Palmer, “Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics,” 96.  
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A. HISTORY OF THE SL IN PERU 
The origins of the SL are rooted in the ideology of Jose Carlos Mariategui, a 
Peruvian intellectual, considered the father of Peruvian Marxism. Mariategui had formed 
the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) in 1928 to fuse communist ideology with 
indigenous Indian nationalism. He believed that a peasant-based uprising by oppressed 
highland Indians could recapture the society that was destroyed by the Spanish 
conquerors and the urban elite in Lima.31 In 1964, the PCP was divided by an ideological 
dispute, which was brought about by the Sino-Soviet split. The pro-Moscow wing of the 
PCP supported a traditional non-violent strategy to struggle for power. The pro-Peking 
group formed the PCP-Bandera Roja (Red Flag) and supported an armed struggle, which 
was meant to encircle Lima and eventually capture state power. 
Furthermore, the Red Flag split in 1967 on charges that the group was not 
initiating an armed struggle. In 1970, radical members, including Guzman, were expelled 
from the group for ideological heresy. At this point, Guzman solidified his core followers 
and formed a more radical organization, named the Revolutionary Student Front for the 
Shining Path of Mariategui (simplified as the Shining Path).32 Guzman became the 
founder of the SL and focused on overthrowing the Peruvian government. The military 
regime had generated a plethora of new political organizations such as unions, peasant 
federations, and rural cooperatives, thus increasing the political left-wing protests. This 
process in turn increased the number of communists. During the 1978 elections, the far 
left groups “earned an impressive” 29 percent of the popular vote.33 In spite of the far left 
increasing in power, some grievances led the SL leadership to believe that an increase in 
communists was not sufficient to shift power to the oppressed. 
31 Paul W. Staeheli, “Collapsing Insurgent Organizations through Leadership Decapitation: A 
Comparison of Targeted Killing and Targeted Incarceration in Insurgent Organizations” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, March 2010), 54.  
32 Gordon H McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru (Report No. R-3781) (Arlington, 
VA: RAND, National Defense Research Institute 1990), 3‒5. 
33 Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 580. 
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B. GRIEVANCES LEADING TO INSURGENCY 
At the start of the twentieth century, a small elite group turned the state into an 
oligarchic society as they “privatized and monopolized” the politics and economics of the 
state for their interests.34 The group, which was an alliance between the owners of large 
land estates, known as gamonales, and the commercial and financial elites, controlled 
Peru. The elites maintained a controlled system that restricted citizenship and repressed 
those who challenged their rule. Furthermore, the oligarchy marginalized the masses by 
excluding illiterates from political life, especially in the highland regions. The Ayacucho 
region, consisting mainly of defensive rural indigenous Indian people, the Incas, had a 
long history of racial domination by oligarchy and haciendas.35 The communist party, 
which emerged in the 1930s, was weakened by state repression and unable to challenge 
the oligarchy rule, which endured until the 1960s.36  
The oligarchic government was dominated by authoritarian rule and was centered 
in the national capital, Lima. The oligarchic government was broken by military 
intervention in 1968, under the leadership of General Juan Velasco Alvarado. Velasco 
attempted a broad reform program, Plan Inca, which was first conceived by a small 
group of left-leaning military officers.37 The reform was the most ambitious state 
building and nation building project in Peru.38 However, the program stumbled as the 
military viewed it as Velasco’s personal rule. The reform alarmed the traditionalists 
within the armed forces, which created a cleavage within the military, and the economic 
elites. Such situations, exacerbated by other domestic issues, resulted in Peru facing an 
economic crisis in the 1970s, which further deepened by the late 1980s. The average 
GDP per capita started falling in the negatives. It dropped from 2.5 percent in the 1960s 
34Burt, Political Violence, 26. 
35 Carlos Ivan Degregori, How Difficult It Is to Be God: Shining Path’s Politics of War in Peru, 1980–
1999, ed. Steve J. Stern (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 4. 
36Burt, Political Violence, 25‒26. 
37 Mario Fumerton, “Rondas Campesinas in the Peruvian Civil War: Peasant Self-Defense 
Organizations in Ayacucho,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 20, no. 4 (October 2001): 472. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3339025. 
38 Burt, Political Violence, 26‒27. 
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to 0.9 percent in 1970s to -3.2 percent in 1980s.39 All these state activities incited the SL 
under the leadership of Guzman to organize and take up arms against the state. 
C. PEOPLE’S WAR IN PERU 
In May 1980, SL started their armed struggle against the Peruvian government to 
establish a people’s democracy in the small town of Chuschi, in Ayacucho. The SL 
leadership initiated the people’s war to liberate the countryside, end the market-oriented 
agricultural production, and destroy the capitalistic economic system.40 The struggle was 
initiated with the burning of electoral ballots on the eve of the country’s presidential 
elections. The government downplayed the developing insurgency through the end of 
1980. By early 1981, the government passed an antiterrorist law, which imposed stiff 
penalties against any individual or group that willingly aided and cooperated with the 
terrorists. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, a brutal internal conflict continued in 
other parts of Peru.  
By early 1992, Lima was almost under siege and the SL was seen on the verge of 
capturing state power. In May 1991, El Diario, a weekly newspaper, asserted that SL had 
achieved strategic balance: a phase in protracted warfare where the rebel forces are 
capable of launching an offensive against the state’s military. The advance of SL so 
alarmed the United States that in March 1992, then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, Bernard Aronson, warned congressional leaders that the United States 
should prevent SL’s rise to power in order to prevent a “third genocide.”41 
On September 12, 1992, an elite police intelligence unit raided a house in Lima 
and captured Guzman. His second-in-command, Elena Iparraguirre, and two high-ranking 
members of SL were arrested as well.42 Though the SL had a second-in-command, there 
is no evidence that Guzman appointed a successor prior to his capture.43 The SL 
39 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 82. 
40 Robert B. Kent, “Geographical Dimensions of the Shining Path Insurgency in Peru,” Geographical 
Review 83, no. 4 (1993): 442. 
41 Burt, Political Violence, 95‒101.  
42  Ibid., 172‒173. 
43 Staeheli, “Collapsing Insurgent Organizations,” 60.   
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collapsed and was no longer a serious threat to the Peruvian state. The SL became 
something like “a rare wild animal still on the loose in the mountains but hardly seen.”44 
Currently, Guzman is in solitary confinement in a prison in a naval base located on a 
small island. It is only from prison that the SL leadership began to consider a pragmatic 
approach in its dealings with the government and called for a negotiated peace.45 This 
indicates that SL leadership realized the importance of a political approach. However, 
some scholars speculate about Guzman’s call for peace, whether it was an intention or 
force of coercion. Although we cannot know the true reason for the call for peace, this 
thesis will argue that it was intentional.  
D. LEADERSHIP  
Guzman, founder of SL was born in 1934, and has remained the spiritual head and 
the chief strategist of the SL. Guzman was a professor of philosophy at the National 
University of San Cristobel de Huamanga in Ayacucho. During his childhood, he was a 
smart and studious boy. Guzman received two degrees—a Ph.D. for his dissertation on 
Immanuel Kant’s theory of space, and a degree in law for his thesis on “The Bourgeois 
Democratic State.” He was later involved in communist party politics and portrayed as a 
theorist of the highest level. Guzman is viewed by his followers as “the Fourth Sword of 
Marxism” as his work and ideological contributions stand along the lines of Marx, Lenin, 
and Mao. He has been SL’s “spiritual leader and guiding light.”46   
The SL centered on the cult of personality of Guzman as his followers called him 
President Gonzalo and even worshipped him.47 Guzman exercised and shaped the SL in 
his own image and doctrinal orientation, and he single-handedly directed SL 
operations.48 He carefully cultivated an image of genius and omnipresence among his 
44 William Yaworsky, “Target Analysis of Shining Path Insurgents in Peru: An Example of U.S. Army 
Psychological Operations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 4 (August 2009): 651‒666, doi: 
10.1080/01402390902987087. 
45 Marks and Palmer, “Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics,” 111.  
46 McCormick, Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 3‒5. 
47 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 19. 
48 Staeheli, “Collapsing Insurgent Organizations,” 54. 
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followers. He had a stronghold over the movement’s agenda; he devised strategies of 
coercion rather than cooperation. According to Guzman, the revolution would triumph 
after the Peruvian people “cross over the river of blood.”49  
Guzman’s followers were obligated to follow the rules of the leader over their 
own conscience. The leader controlled his organization by a process of criticism and self-
criticism, a mechanism developed during Lenin’s time to control groups and 
individuals.50 In the process, condemned individuals faced harsh questioning and 
analysis. If the individual failed to convince the SL of his or her own shortcomings, that 
individual faced severe punishment or even death. Mao argued that only when discipline 
is self-imposed are guerillas able to understand the cause of the fight and obedience to 
orders. According to Mao, all subordinates must obey superiors, but the “basis for 
guerilla discipline must be the individual conscience. With guerillas, a discipline of 
compulsion is ineffective.”51  
The organization had a series of regional commands, which were responsible for 
establishing bases. Guzman exercised his influence through a Central Committee, which 
together oversaw the movement’s operations. Guzman’s tight authority over the 
organization was based on four properties: 
The group leader, in this case Abimael Guzman, is believed to possess a 
unique vision of the future and superhuman qualities; group followers 
unquestionably accept the leader’s views, statements, and judgment; they 
comply with his orders and directives without condition; and they give the 
leader an unqualified devotion.52  
According to Carlos Ivan Degregori, Guzman believed in power. The SL party 
considered itself a “privileged instrument for taking power,” since “everything but power 
is an illusion.”53 According to Manwaring, the primary objective of Guzman’s 
49 The Threat of the Shining Path to Democracy in Peru: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Western Hemisphere Affairs (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1992), 127. 
50 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 118. 
51 Mao Tse Tung, “On Guerilla Warfare,” trans. Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Griffith, in Conflict after the 
Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 548. 
52 McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 7. 
53 Degregori, How Difficult It Is to Be God, 114. 
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insurgency was power, which is achieved by “… a vision and purposeful long-term 
program for gaining control of a state or society. Power is maintained as that organization 
replaces the state.”54 According to philosophers, power and human nature are the key 
factors for aggression. Thucydides, an ancient scholar, argues that power, fear, honor, and 
interest all remain key factors in war.55 This does suggest that the main objective of 
Guzman was to gain power through armed struggle. He showed no interest in engaging 
the government of Peru in any kind of dialogue and did not compromise even though 
there were elements within the organization that preferred moderate lines.56 Since 
“central to all dictatorships is extreme obedience,”57 Guzman had developed a 
dictatorship over his organization. For these reasons, Guzman’s actions closely parallel 
the actions of the Viet Cong and Khymer Rouge leaders.58  
James Ron contrasts Guzman with other communist leaders of the former Soviet 
Union, China, and North Korea. In the states mentioned, the leaders tended to develop a 
personality cult after the leaders came to power, but Guzman developed an autocratic 
position from the beginning of the armed struggle.59 Guzman developed a personality 
cult before taking power, which is unique in a revolutionary movement.60 Guzman held 
supreme authority over the hierarchical organization not only in the operational role of 
the SL, but also in the personal affairs of its members. He regulated everything from 
meetings to marriages of its members and even set their wedding dates.61 
54 Max G. Manwaring, “Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: The Shining Path Beckons,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political Science 541 (1995): 158, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1048282.  
55 Thucydides, “The Melian Dialogue,” in Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War 
and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 69–73. 
56 The Threat of the Shining Path: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 
70‒71. 
57 Fathali M. Moghaddam, The Psychology of Dictatorship (Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association, 2013), 8. 
58 Christopher C. Harmon, “The Purpose of Terrorism within Insurgency: Shining Path in Peru,” Small 
Wars and Insurgencies 3, no. 2 (1992): 171, doi: 10.1080/09592319208423019. 
59 Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 575. 
60 Yaworsky, “Target Analysis of Shining Path,” 651‒666. 
61 David A Siegel and Joseph K. Young, “Simulating Terrorism: Credible Commitment, Costly 
Signaling, and Strategic Behavior,” PS: Political Science and Politics 42, no. 4 (Oct 2009): 768, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40646685. 
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His personality cult had developed a psychological impact upon the members of 
the SL as they sought to achieve a sense of obedience to the authoritarian to fulfill the 
goal. Stanley Graham states that: “Obedience is the psychological mechanism that links 
individual action to political purpose.”62 Guzman established a dictatorial rule as he 
maintained power within his organization. Guzman prevented creative decision making 
due to his control of decision making, such that Marks and Palmer remarked that Guzman 
had highly centralized decision-making capability, but lacked the adaptability to meet 
new challenges.63 To understand why Guzman did not envision any concessions in 
exchange for power makes it necessary to analyze the ideological objectives of the 
revolution.  
E. IDEOLOGY 
Observing the success of the Chinese people’s war, Guzman believed that an 
armed revolution employing Mao’s strategy of the people’s war could successfully lead 
to the capture of state power in Peru. In his visit to China during the Cultural Revolution, 
he developed contacts with top communist leaders and was able to intensify his ideology. 
In the 1970s when other small parties that formed the Peruvian Left “went to the masses,” 
SL leadership with the initial nucleus withdrew to the University of Ayacucho to dedicate 
itself to the study Marxism. The formation of the organization itself was a reason for its 
commitment to SL ideology. Guzman and the initial nucleus of the organization, which 
consisted of radical students, were “ideologically and organically very compact” and 
converted itself into an orthodox party from the top to down, and from ideology to 
organization.64 
Guzman applied ideology in a Peruvian context, referred to as Gonzalo Thought, 
which was a synthesis of Marx, Lenin, Mao’s peasant-based revolution, and Mariategui’s 
62Stanley Milgram, “How Good People Do Bad Things,” in Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments 
on Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 183. 
63 Marks and Palmer, “Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics,” 109. 
64 Degregori, How Difficult It Is to Be God, 114. 
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“native socialism.” His followers accepted the ideology without question.65 He opted for 
the Maoist strategy of people’s war as it employed the peasants and applied the three 
magic wands—the party, the armed struggle, and the front. He visualized a complete 
peasants’ armed struggle and focused on it, but did not properly visualize the front, 
whether it should consist of a class front or a front made of parties.66   
Guzman’s ideology advocated complete social change through violence. The 
revolution was to provide an ideological basis for a new socialist Peruvian state. His 
ideological approach to capture power and create a “nationalist, Indian, and popular 
democracy” in accordance with Peruvian socialism in the pre-Columbian (Quechua) 
community67 was not a tangible political objective. Instead of embracing local cultures of 
indigenous communities, the party’s position became antagonistic to local culture and 
traditions in the name of purifying Peruvian culture.68  
SL interpreted the doctrine to view violence as an end in itself in order to drive 
out traditional ways of thought.69 Guzman attempted to impose “scientific” aspects of 
Marxism as his ideology and rejected local values, practices, and traditions. His ideology 
did not embrace popular support as he challenged all those not supporting the SL. For SL, 
“those who stood in its way were the enemy, and—even if they were unarmed civilians—
should be assassinated ….”70 Some analysts view SL’s ideology as within the frame of 
the “Gang of Four” Maoism: a strand of Chinese political thought that became fiercely 
anti-reformist during the Cultural Revolution.  
He considered other leftists ideologically impure and revisionists. Guzman 
viewed Communist revolution in other parts of the world, such as China and the former 
65 The Threat of the Shining Path: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 
41. 
66 Abimael Guzman, “‘Exclusive’ Comments by Abimael Guzman,” World Affairs 156, no. 1 (1993): 
55–56, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672373. 
67 Manwaring, “Peru’s Sendero Luminoso,” 158. 
68 Harmon, “The Purpose of Terrorism,” 181. 
69 Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 575. 
70 Maiah Jaskoski, Military Politics and Democracy in the Andes (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 2013), 39. 
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Soviet Union, as revisionist dictatorships and unworthy of the Marxist-Leninist legacy 
because they had lost the legitimacy of ideological principles.71 Guzman condemned 
International leftists as “fascists,” condemned the Soviet Union for its corruption and 
“treasonist ideology,” called Che Guevara a “choir girl,” and singled out China for 
betraying Mao Tse Tung. He assumed the leadership role in a pure ideological revolution, 
and considered his party to be the vanguard of the world’s communist revolution. For this 
reason he had to obtain resources locally.72 Guzman reportedly said in 1984, “Blood 
makes us stronger,” and some academics agree that SL’s ideology had its roots in the 
leadership’s political socialization with Maoists, rather than in a blend of Mao and 
Mariategui’s thoughts.73  
Peter Waldman argues that socio-revolutionary terrorists’ use of violence is 
complicated as the attacks are designed to induce the state to overreact and represent a 
call for a general uprising of the “oppressed and exploited mass.”74 SL leadership 
adopted a strategy of provoking the armed forces to violence. The ideology of violent 
methods against the state and civil population was expected to ruin the reputation of the 
state, first among the rural population and later among the rest of the Peruvians.75 This, 
in turn, would allow for the establishment of a new society. The violence was so intense 
that SL leadership asserted that the “triumph of the revolution would cost million 
deaths.”76 The violence made the party take up methods similar to those of terrorist-like 
organizations rather than an insurgent group, as SL turned out to be “explicitly military 
and unabashedly terroristic.”77 There was so much violence on the local population that 
the United States was alarmed and drew a parallel that if Guzman’s power was 
71Yaworsky, “Target Analysis of Shining Path,” 653. 
72 Marks and Palmer, “Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics,” 97‒98. 
73 Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 575. 
74 Peter Waldman, “Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures,” 
International Social Movement Research 4 (1992): 246. 
75 Mika Kerttunen, “A Transformed Insurgency: The Strategy of the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist) in the Light of Communist Insurgency Theories and a Modified Beaufrean Exterior/Interior 
Framework,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 22, no. 1 (2011): 87, doi:10.1080/09592318.2011.546583. 
76 Degregori, How Difficult It Is to Be God, 25. 
77 Harmon, “Purpose of Terrorism,” 170.  
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consolidated, then his regime would be “as bloody and radical as the Khymer Rouge in 
the 1970s.”78 
F. POPULAR SUPPORT 
David Galula argues that an insurgency is a “two-dimensional war fought for the 
control of the population,” which has no front, no safe rear.79 As the support of 
population is necessary for insurgents and counterinsurgents, population plays a vital role 
in an insurgency. Peasants provide the insurgents with the most basic need—popular 
support,80 which is required for the supply of recruits, information, logistics, funds, 
hiding places, and thus, “the allegiance, trust, and confidence of populations will be the 
final arbiters of success.”81  
Degregori concludes that SL leadership manipulated the local population to attract 
them to SL for two reasons. First, for novelty, was power. The SL leadership incited local 
people with the idea that their movement would lead them to become ministers, military 
commanders, and judges. Exercising power in a local community provided opportunities 
for the rural youth. They were given roles as justices in local courts and collectors of 
revenues for the party. Youth were attracted also to adventure in the movement as they 
learned about weapons and explosives. The awareness and enthusiasm about the idea of 
power fascinated more rural youth due to an increase in literacy rate. Between 1960 and 
1980, the youth population enrolled in secondary or tertiary education had increased from 
19 to 76 percent.82  
Second, the SL leadership created the hope of progress. The SL enjoyed peasant 
support initially as the organization preached a “message of new life; a government of the 
people, of the peasants; a New Democracy in which there would be no more exploitation 
78 The Threat of the Shining Path: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 
42. 
79 Galula, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 579. 
80 Raj Desai and Harry Eckstein, “Insurgency: The Transformation of Peasant Rebellion,” World 
Politics 42, no. 4 (Jul 1990): 443, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010510.  
81 Colonel Gian P. Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: The Folly of Counterinsurgency, in Conflict after 
the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 183. 
82 Degregori, How Difficult It Is to Be God, 96‒114. 
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or corruption, a society without the rich.”83 The SL also punished corrupt and unpopular 
leaders, and distributed confiscated goods such as livestock of wealthy individuals and 
merchandise. Some observers estimate that by the mid-1980s, 25 to 40 percent of Peru’s 
population was under SL influence or control.84  
Rural youth, who formed the key links in SL’s chain of expansion, found 
themselves caught between the cadres and the peasants, as shown in Figure 1. Rural 
youth were trapped between party orders to destroy livestock and the weeping peasants. 
One of SL’s principle slogans: “The party has a thousand eyes and a thousand ears,” 
caused the peasants to live in a state of fear.85 The SL killed whoever did not accept or 
support the SL dictates, and informers were threatened. This suggests that rural youth, 
which formed the key links of expansion, also formed a weak link between party cadres 




Figure 1.  The relationship between the SL party and the masses.86  
83 Fumerton, “Rondas Campesinas,” 474. 
84 Yaworsky, “Target Analysis of Shining Path,” 657. 
85 Degregori, How Difficult It Is to Be God, 123‒125. 
86 Degregori, How Difficult It Is to Be God, 124. 
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Most scholars of revolution agree that peasants “will consider rebellion when they 
judge their right to subsistence to be seriously threatened.”87 The SL’s strict and 
unpopular policies, such as curfews, prohibition of the consumption of alcohol, restriction 
on fiestas, and restriction on the marketing of local goods to urban areas angered the 
peasants.88 The SL’s increasing demands were seen as exploitative, which the peasants 
denounced. Thus, the peasants in some hilly regions of Peru started growing disenchanted 
with the SL by the second half of the 1980s.89 The SL started losing the trust and 
confidence of the population. The SL also contested and competed in the barriadas, the 
shanty towns on the outskirts of Lima. They assassinated grassroots leaders, created fear, 
and faced confrontation from other community organizations. 
Conservative philosophers argue that when an autocratic leader prescribes an 
action that is evil, people tend to “carry out the act [rather] than to wrench at the structure 
of authority.”90 The SL coerced the local population to discourage and deter the public 
from opposing them. Civilians were also killed if they refused to live in accordance with 
the movement’s rules.91 The violence was intense. SL committed 54 percent and MRTA 
1.5 percent of political killings.92 
In an insurgency, Weintein argues that rebels and the population strike a deal, 
where rebels provide security in exchange for public support.93 The SL did not provide 
necessary security against state repression. As SL started expanding, the Peruvian armed 
forces were authorized for a counterinsurgency role on December, 29, 1982, and 
launched brutal military repression, described as “aggressive counterinsurgency.”94 
Between 1983 and 1984, the military had killed one-third of the total victims in the entire 
87 Fumerton, “Rondas Campesinas,” 472. 
88 Kent, “Geographical Dimensions,” 444. 
89 Burt, Political Violence, 178.  
90 Milgram, “How Good People Do Bad Things,” 183‒184. 
91 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 240. 
92 Burt, Political Violence, 2. 
93 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 191. 
94 Jaskoski, Military Politics, 113. 
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conflict, and most of them were civilians.95 The SL leadership also followed an 
aggressive military posture, and Burt argues that popular support for the SL started 
decreasing when the SL failed to protect the peasants from the military repression of 
1983‒1984.96  
The brutal methods of coercion and violence by the SL led to the emergence and 
spread of rondas campesinas or self-defense committees, which expanded in almost all 
regions by the end of the conflict.97 Mario Fumerton and Christopher C. Harmon argue 
that rondas was not a government strategy, but a popular invention, created by the anger 
and frustration resulting from SL intervening in village life.98 Though there was evidence 
that the number of active peasant participation in village self-defense increased from 
1985, it was only after Fujimori came into power that the strategy was incorporated as a 
counterinsurgent strategy.99  
The emergence of the rondas backfired on the organization because the same 
peasants who defended the SL started turning against the SL. In spite of the growing 
resentment among the local population, the SL did not stop its killings. The SL was still 
engaged in rampages in later years as 16 massacres of 12 or more persons were 
committed between December 1987 and February 1992.100 Sigmund Freud notes such 
violent attitudes, and documents that human instincts are of two types—those that 
conserve and unify, and those that destroy and kill.101 Observing SL’s actions, one 
surmises that Guzman had the instincts to destroy. This could be one reason why the SL 
never gained international sympathy. In 1992, Alexander Wilde, then executive director 
95 Degregori, How Difficult It Is to Be God, 22. 
96 Burt, Political Violence, 122. 
97Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 275. 
98 Harmon, “The Purpose of Terrorism,” 178. 
99 Fumerton, “Rondas Campesinas,” 488. 
100 Mahendra Lawoti, “Ethnic Dimensions of the Maoist Insurgencies: Indigenous Groups’ 
Participation and Insurgency Trajectories in Nepal, Peru, and India,” in The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: 
Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (New York: Routledge 
Contemporary South Asia Series, 2010), 144. 
101 Sigmund Freud, “Why War,” in Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and 
Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 179. 
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of the Washington Office on Latin America, stated that the SL used extensive and vicious 
terror tactics because they “strike directly at human rights figures and popular leaders, the 
foundation of democracy.”102   
G. CONCLUSION 
The Shining Path was “the most brutal guerrilla group that has ever appeared in 
the Western Hemisphere:”103 an individualized movement that posed a threat to the 
Peruvian state. Guzman’s authoritarianism and strong control over his organization made 
his leadership indisputable. Guzman considered his organization as a pure revolutionary 
group. Guzman’s strategy of using coercion and violence in which the SL embarked on 
ruthless punitive expeditions against Peruvian civilians resulted in SL’s loss of popular 
support. Despite the significant success won by the SL, the organization collapsed due to 
SL leadership’s ideology, which was not based on a foundation of the people, but rather 
on the cult of personality.  
The capture of Guzman on September 12, 1992, by a special police intelligence 
unit, the National Directorate Against Terrorism (DINCOTE),104 created a vacuum in the 
leadership of the SL. Guzman’s subordinates were unable to fill the gap as there was no 
successor. Guzman was not killed in military operations, nor sentenced to death after his 
capture. This is significant as “the preservation of Guzman is likely to perpetrate a 
leadership vacuum in Shining Path because while he remains alive, nobody is likely to 
seize the initiative too boldly.”105 With a clear understanding of the SL movement, the 
discussion now turns to another insurgency that was framed under similar lines of 
protracted warfare. The Maoist insurgency in Nepal grew out of almost similar 
backgrounds of environment and grievances, but the two insurgencies had a dramatic 
difference in outcome.  
 
102 Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 571. 
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III. COMMUNIST PARTY OF NEPAL (MAOIST)  
This chapter examines an insurgency similar to the one discussed in Chapter II to 
show the different approaches adopted by the leaders of the two groups. The Maoist 
insurgency led by the CPN(M) was a unique revolution because it is rare for a left 
extremist party to join hands with bourgeoisie parties to resolve a decade-long 
insurgency.106 The insurgency was also unique as it expanded when international 
communist movements had taken a back seat and communist regimes worldwide were 
experiencing a backlash.107 Many scholars argue that transition from authoritarianism to 
elections decreases the likelihood of armed insurgency; the Maoist insurgency challenged 
that view. Nepal was witnessing a transition to democracy when the country was plunged 
into an armed struggle. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder argue that: 
“Democratization typically creates a syndrome of weak central authority, unstable 
domestic coalitions, and high-energy mass politics.”108 Nepal faced a similar situation, in 
which Prachanda was able to exploit and lead the people’s war. The Maoist people’s war 
was a ten-year-old violent conflict that left 13,000 dead, but ended in a different outcome 
from the one experienced by the SL.   
This chapter will attempt to show that the leadership of the CPN(M) did not adopt 
the Maoist insurgency as a cult of personality, but rather the leadership adapted to the 
changing environment. The chapter will describe the conditions that led the CPN(M) to 
launch an insurgency when Nepal’s democracy was still at its incipient stage. During an 
insurgency, the internal dynamics of a state and external factors play a crucial role in 
shaping an insurgency. The chapter will portray the ideological objectives to show how 
the leadership of the CPN(M) adapted to the internal dynamics and external factors. The 
CPN(M) gradually modified their classic Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist ideology to form 
an alliance with democratic parties.   
106 Munni, “Bringing the Maoists down from the Hills,” 313. 
107 B. C. Upreti, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Nature, Growth, and Impact,” South Asian Survey 
13, no. 1(2006): 36‒50, doi: 10.1177/097152310501300103. 
108 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,” in Conflict after the Cold 
War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 387. 
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As in the previous chapter, this chapter will also deal with CPN(M)’s application 
of specific organizational resources—leadership, ideology, and popular support—to show 
that the Maoist insurgency was not an individualistic movement. The study of the 
aforementioned variables will demonstrate that the leadership of CPN(M) did not follow 
the Maoist dogmatic approach, but rather switched strategies that would best suit the 
organization. The CPN(M) leadership was assisted by moderate ideologues who tried to 
bring other leftist organizations together rather than execute in isolation. Initially, though 
the struggle was a class struggle, it adopted ethnic lines to win the support of the 
indigenous population, and unlike the SL leadership, the CPN(M) leadership relied more 
upon selective violence than indiscriminate killings. Before examining with the 
insurgency, it is necessary to introduce the historical background of the CPN(M) in 
Nepal, which will be discussed in the next section.  
A. HISTORY OF CPN(M) IN NEPAL 
The root of the Communist movement in Nepal dates back to the birth of the 
Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) in 1949 in Calcutta, India.109 Since its beginning, the 
party has witnessed many personality clashes, splits, and reunions. When the general 
secretary of CPN, Dr Keshar Jung Rayamajhi, supported the autocratic rule of King 
Mahendra in December 15, 1960, the party split into two factions—the pro-Moscow 
faction led by Rayamajhi and pro-Peking faction consisting of Pushpa Lal, Man Mohan 
Adhikari, among others.110  B.C. Upreti referred the pro-Moscow faction as royalists and 
the pro-Peking faction as revolutionaries.111 The split within the communist parties 
continues until today.  
The formation of the CPN(M) can be traced back to 1974 in Banaras, India, after 
the formation of the CPN(Fourth Convention). When the central nucleus of the CPN was 
facing leadership challenges due to ideological differences within the party, Mohan 
Bikram Singh and Nirmal Lama sought to bring the various communist parties under one 
109 Lawoti, “Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 5 
110 Thapa and Sijapati, Kingdom under Siege, 20‒23. 
111 Upreti, “Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 36‒50. 
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umbrella. The CPN (Fourth Convention) became the strongest communist group in 
advocating an armed rebellion against the state. However, the king announced a 
referendum in 1979 for a transition to multiparty democracy, which diverted attention 
from an armed rebellion.  
This further splintered the communist party into CPN(Masal), which was formed 
by Mohan Bikram Singh and Mohan Baidya, and CPN(Mashal). Babu Ram Bhattarai 
became the general secretary of CPN(Masal) in 1980. Mohan Baidya broke away and 
formed another party in which Pushpa Kamal Dahal became the general secretary. 
However, in 1990, various hardcore Maoist groups formed the CPN Unity Center with 
Dahal as the chairman.112 In 1995, after a number of Maoist leftist parties joined 
together, including the United People’s Front Nepal (UPFN), the largest Maoist front 
organization, the CPN(M) was formed. Most members of CPN(Masal) can be considered 
as the main group of people that later emerged as the CPN(M) leaders.113  
History shows that by 1990, the communists of Nepal had established themselves 
as a major political force in Nepal despite the world heading towards a post-communist 
global order. However, the aspirations of the communists were not being met due to 
certain grievances. 
B. GRIEVANCES LEADING TO INSURGENCY 
Prior to 1990, Nepal was an autocratic regime ruled by a king, with a persistent 
legacy of inequalities, interconnected caste, ethnic, and gender-based exclusions. 
According to Michael E. Brown, “a single factor explanation, in short, cannot account for 
significant variation in the incidence and intensities of internal and ethnic conflict.”114 
Jack Snyder puts forward a connection between democratization and conflict and claims 
that as more people take a larger role in politics, conflict within a country becomes more 
112 Upreti, “Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 37.  
113 Thapa and Sijapati, Kingdom under Siege, 24‒45. 
114 Michael E. Brown, “The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview,” in Nationalism and Ethnic 
Conflict (revised edition), eds. Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn Jones, and Steven E. 
Miller (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), 4. 
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likely.115 Similarly, Thapa argues that internal conflicts arise in countries in transition, as 
the state is not in a position to work out a peaceful settlement or use “all-out force” to 
subdue challenges to its authority.116 Though there are various conspiracy theories 
leading to the development of the Maoist insurgency, some underlying factors suggest the 
conflict. 
First, because of the weakness of the state, the structural factor can be applied. 
The establishment of a democracy created a vacuum of power, which was filled by 
rudimentary political institutions. Starting from 1846, the Ranas ruled Nepal for about 
104 years and vested all the state power in them. They reduced the power of Shah kings 
to that of a ceremonial figurehead. However, after the end of colonial period in South 
Asia, the Rana rule ended in 1951 and paved the way for a short and experimental 
popular rule that also ended with the takeover by King Mahendra in 1960, also called the 
Panchayat years. The Panchayat era ended with the re-establishment of democracy in 
1990. During the initial period of 1990 democracy, there was a continuous seesaw battle 
between the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (UML) for grabbing of 
power. This led to instability in Nepal to such an extent that none of the incumbent 
governments could retain power for even one year.117 This suggests that by 1996, when 
the CPN(M) launched their struggle, the democratic parties had not garnered sufficient 
political experience as they were still at their rudimentary stage.118 
Second, the economic and social factors were important, as people’s aspirations 
were not met. Economically and socially it is viewed that “relative deprivation or the gap 
between expected and achieved well-being—can increase alienation and push groups 
towards violent conflict.”119 State powers were invested in a few feudal elites. Also, 
Nepal had remained in extreme poverty and the gross national income per capita was 
115 Snyder, From Voting to Violence, 27.  
116 Deepak Thapa, “The Making of the Maoist Insurgency,” in Nepal in Transition: From People’s 
War to Fragile Peace, eds. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 50. 
117 Upreti, “Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 42.  
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U.S. $290 in 2006. In 1996, the mid-western and far western regions were facing poverty 
rates at 76 percent as compared to 4 percent in Kathmandu.120 There was 
disproportionate regional distribution of resources as the Central Region, where 
Kathmandu is located and the power-elite has a strong hold, was far more developed than 
the mid-western and far western regions. The social order was exclusionary as it 
classified all groups in distinct castes within the broad framework of the Hindu system.  
Third, political factors, such as adopting discriminatory or exclusionary politics, 
increased resentment amongst marginalized groups. The 30 years of autocratic rule ended 
in 1990, establishing democracy and enacting a new constitution, which guaranteed civil 
liberties to all citizens, regardless of religion, race, gender, caste, tribe, or ideology. The 
new constitution established Nepal as a Hindu Kingdom, with Nepali as the official 
language. The constitution barred the Election Commission from registering or 
recognizing any political party explicitly on basis of religion, caste, community, tribe, or 
region.  
Fourth, the perceived cultural discrimination against ethnic minorities was another 
cause of the conflict. The marginalized group, who had been discriminated against by the 
state, had hoped that the new constitution would recognize their identity based on 
ethnicity, language, culture, and religion. Writing on and discussing ethnic issues were 
discouraged during the democratic period. The state was only able to give “definitions of 
multiethnic and multilingual” as a form of recognition of the country’s diversity.121 
Social transformation that was expected by the public was ignored. Some scholars argue 
that when state institutions grant privileges to one group and exclude others, resentment 
is likely to build up. In the early 1990s, Nepal was undergoing a cultural shift that 
encouraged the excluded groups to engage in political activism. Whatever the possible 
factors which acted together as a motivator and facilitator, and caused the insurgency, the 
leadership of the CPN(M) was highly effective in manipulating the deprived people to 
strengthen its military and political fronts to launch the people’s war.  
120 George Graham, “People’s War? Self Interest, Coercion and Ideology in Nepal’s Maoist 
Insurgency,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 18, no. 2 (2007): 233, 
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C. PEOPLE’S WAR IN NEPAL 
According to many social movement theorists, collective mobilization is based on 
three factors—the structure of political opportunities and constraints; mobilizing 
structures; and framing strategies and tactics for mobilization.122 Solely on the basis of 
economic matters, 38 percent of Nepal’s population is extremely poor and cannot meet 
their basic needs.123 Furthermore, legitimate political parties’ inability to be inclusive and 
the state’s entrenchment in the feudal, caste, and patriarchal institutions have led to the 
radicalization of economically weak and marginalized indigenous groups. These 
indigenous groups constitute about 37 percent of Nepal’s population.124 Given such 
socio-economic and political conditions, politics is expected to play a significant role in 
facilitating contending demands. 
On February 4, 1996, the CPN(M)’s open political wing, the UPFN (United 
People’s Front, Nepal), had submitted a 40-point list of demands to the government with 
a warning of an armed struggle if the grievances outlined in the list were not fulfilled.125 
The 40-point demand was for an end to foreign elements’ intrusion and domination of 
Nepal; for a secular state free of all discrimination and oppression, with the monarchy 
stripped of its privileges; and for a wider range of welfare provisions consisting of social 
and economic reforms. As the government paid little attention to their demands, the 
CPN(M) laid plans for the people’s war, which was a “well-tested and efficient 
mechanism for seizure of state power.”126 
The CPN(M) followed Mao’s strategy of guerilla warfare and mass political 
mobilization in the pursuit of a communist republic. On February 13, 1996, the people’s 
war waged by the CPN(M) caught the Nepalese people by surprise as the war was 
signaled by an attack on police posts in the districts of Rolpa, Rukum, and Sindhuli. The 
122Bandita Sijapati, “In Pursuit of Recognition: Regionalism, Madhesi Identity and the Madhesh 
Andolan,” in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990, eds. 
Mahendra Lawati and Susan Hangen (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 155. 
123 Thapa and Sijapati, Kingdom under Siege, 58. 
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125 Thapa and Sijapati, Kingdom under Siege, 85. 
126 Marks and Palmer, “Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics,” 91.  
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CPN(M) initially followed Mao’s three-stage strategy of guerilla warfare—strategic 
defense, strategic balance, and strategic offense. Accordingly, they mobilized the 
peasants and the poor in the rural areas, which presumably would surround the capital 
and succeed in securing their aim. On November 26, 2001, the Nepalese government 
declared a state of emergency, promulgated the TADO (Terrorist and Disruptive 
Activities [Control and Punishment] Ordinance), and declared the Maoists as 
terrorists.127 The conflict witnessed variations in the strategy and expanded over time to 
include wide swaths of the countryside. 
After a decade, the conflict ended through a negotiated political settlement that 
co-opted some of the CPN(M)’s demands. Upon signing the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in November 2006, the CPN(M) joined the mainstream political parties in 
parliament. The CPN(M) also succeeded in heading the national government after the 
party was declared victorious in 2008 democratic multiparty elections. Furthermore, state 
politics changed as the formation of political parties based on caste/ethnicity was 
legalized. In May 28, 2008, Nepal was declared a Federal Democratic Republic, which 
ended 239 years of monarchy rule.128 
D. LEADERSHIP  
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias “Prachanda,” was an average student in school. While 
studying in Patan Campus in Kathmandu, he made connections with communist leaders 
and was able to acquire communist literature. It was after joining an agricultural institute 
that he started developing his communist career by keeping a close affiliation with local 
communist leaders. Prachanda joined communist politics as a full-time underground 
127 Michael Hutt, ed. “Monarchy, Democracy and Maoism in Nepal,” in Himalayan People’s War: 
Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), 11. 
128 Mallika Shakya, “Nepali Economic History through the Ethnic Lens: Changing State Alliances 
with Business Elites,” in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990, 
eds. Mahendra Lawati and Susan Hangen (New York: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, 2013), 
53. 
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activist in the 1970s, and his organization followed communist principles, quite similar to 
the moderate communist models.129   
Weinstein argues that the expansion of the insurgency was mainly due to the 
highly educated and ideologically “sophisticated core of leadership members.”130 Many 
leadership members had university degrees from abroad, except one member of the 
standing committee who was self-taught.131 Prachanda holds a Bachelor of Science 
degree in agriculture. Baburam Bhattarai, considered as Prachanda’s chief  ideologue and 
one of the members of the standing committee, holds a Doctor of Philosophy from a 
university in India with a dissertation on “Natural and regional issues in Nepal’s 
underdevelopment.”132  
It is interesting to note that Prachanda was elevated to the rank of chairman quite 
rapidly. In 1984, at the age of 29, after leading a students’ union for three years, he was 
elected as a member to the Central Committee of CPN(Masal). After the split among 
Maoists, he associated himself with the Vaidya group. Some of the Maoists, under the 
leadership of Vaidya, conducted an operation code-named Sector Kanda to attack isolated 
police posts and blacken the faces of the king’s statues located in the capital. In the 
incident, a few members were arrested and the group became public. The event was 
criticized by the central committee members, who then raised Prachanda to the post of 
general secretary of the CPN(M) in 1989. He then became the chairman of the CPN(M).  
The organizational hierarchy of CPN(M) under the chairman consisted of 
standing committee, politburo, central committee, divisional commands, regional 
bureaus, sub-regional bureaus, district, area, and cell committees. Prachanda is the 
chairman of the politburo’s seven-member standing committee and the supreme 
commander of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Prachanda has the authority to take 
all immediate decisions, which are generally discussed by party committees. Though he 
129 International Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Maoists: Their Aim, Structure and Strategy 
(Kathmandu and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2005), 7. 
130 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 303. 
131 Ibid. 
132 International Crisis Group, 2005, 34. 
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holds a tight grip on the party, the party committees have the power to endorse, revise, or 
reject the decisions.133  
Prachanda was aware of the importance of international politics and realized the 
importance of establishing connections with revolutionary leaders and international 
communist organizations in supporting its armed struggle. Prachanda was also calculative 
in taking risks. He was willing to take risks to prevent a split in the organization and for 
the survival of the organization.  
E. IDEOLOGY 
Citing Charles Tilly, Graham notes that ideology can become salient for drawing 
conditions for conflict when brokers “sharpen previously blurred us-them boundaries.”134  
Ideology builds conflict when it constitutes a new belief to alter the social conditions of 
people. Based on the principles of Marx, Lenin, and Mao, the insurgency in Nepal drew 
inspiration from other revolutionary movements, like Peru’s Shining Path. One of the 
reasons for the Maoists leadership to initiate the armed struggle was disparity amongst 
the class system. The CPN(M) initiated its people’s war with a goal to “overthrow 
bourgeois democracy, defeat imperialism, abolish the feudal monarchy and establish a 
communist people’s republic.”135 The Maoists used binary oppositions like oppressed-
oppressor, proletariat-feudal, reactionary-revolutionary to incite and mobilize people for 
their cause,136 and fanaticized promises of equality amongst rural people.  
According to Amanda Snellinger, “the basis for all political agendas is political 
ideology,” which depends on the internal process and the organizational structures to 
demonstrate to what degree the theory and practice is linked.137 The CPN(M) ideology 
133 International Crisis Group, 2005, 34. 
134 Graham, “People’s War,” 241. 
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136 Lawoti, “Evolution and Growth of Maoist Insurgency,” 17. 
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was expressed in their agenda through an appealing and populist 40-point demand.138 
Furthermore, the CPN(M) adopted a military and political approach simultaneously. 
Thus, though some scholars argue that the Maoists were involved in extensive coercion 
and violence, it can be argued that their ideology did not revolve around the politics of 
violence. 
When fulfilling objectives seems to be failing, then revising strategies remains an 
important integral part of leadership qualities. The Maoist leadership revised their 
strategies and became adaptive to the changing environment to develop a “correct” 
ideology139 on three accounts. First, the Maoist movement was a class struggle, but its 
leadership augmented the strength of its organization by mobilizing the ethnic line, which 
will be discussed in the next section.  
Second, as their envisioned strategy of encirclement of the capital city was not 
possible, the CPN(M) leadership sought alternate means for survival. The leadership 
made a new master plan for carrying out a propaganda campaign in order to incite a 
general uprising among the bureaucracy and army.140 However, this strategy did not 
work either as most of the bureaucrats belonged to the middle class and they did not 
support the CPN(M). The CPN(M) leadership could not create a cleavage within the 
Nepalese Army, as the army always remained united because it had a strong legacy in the 
formation of Nepal as a state.  
Third, the CPN(M) embarked on a pragmatic path after its second National 
Conference in February 2001. The decisions of the conference empowered the chairman 
and declared that the party would adopt and follow Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and the 
Prachanda Path. According to the Prachanda Path, the rural masses were to be 
complemented with urban mobilization as it called for a move “from the periphery to the 
center” in the form of labor and student unionism.141 But in the urban areas, where the 
138 See Annex III for 40-point demands in Deepak Thapa, Kingdom under Siege, 189. 
139 Lawoti, “Evolution and Growth of Maoist Insurgency,” 12. 
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majority is middle class, the party lacked the necessary support from the middle class.142 
Their approach toward the population may be analyzed as a mixture of “ethno population 
centric” and coercion. 
F. POPULAR SUPPORT 
The importance of insurgency thriving on popular support is established by Mao’s 
dictum that the population is to insurgents what water is for fish. Therefore, it is essential 
for insurgent leaders to devise strategies to gain popular support, as Huntington argues 
that the decisive aspect of revolutionary war is the “struggle for the loyalty of the 
vulnerable sector.”143 Though there are various means of achieving popular support, 
addressing the grievances of the population may be one key method.  
The Maoist leadership targeted the rural peasants based on Mao’s strategy in 
achieving its goal. Many scholars argue that addressing the grievances of rural peasants 
motivated the peasants, who were oppressed by the landed elites, to join the struggle. 
Nepal is an agrarian country with more than 80 percent of the population employed in 
agriculture, where majority of them are landless peasants, smallholders, or tenants. The 
Maoists established the rights of peasants to the land they farmed and emancipated the 
peasants from debt servitude.  
However, the strategy attracted peasants from only a few of the hilly areas. The 
appeal did not succeed as expected. The tenancy arrangements between the peasants and 
the landed elites constrained the peasants from joining the conflict for fear of retaliation 
by the landed elites, and so it “reduced the costs for peasants to join the insurgency.”144 
Furthermore, the Maoists executing the landed elites was seen as a horrendous act by the 
tenants, as the legacy of landed elites and tenants had established a kind of bonded 
relationship between the two. The conflict was not garnering as much popular support as 
142 Gobyn, “From War to Peace,” 425. 
143 Huntington, “Patterns of Violence,” 565. 
144 Madhav Joshi and T. David Mason, “Land Tenure, Democracy, and Patterns of Violence during 
the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 1996‒2005,” Social Science Quarterly 91, no. 4 (2010): 995.  
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expected, and so the CPN(M) leadership switched their strategy and supported the ethnic 
people’s issues.  
According to Weinstein, the inception of the insurgency and the attraction of 
people to the rebel group shape a rebel group’s strategies.145 In the words of Polletta: 
“Organizational forms … are often appealing for their symbolic associations, and 
especially, their association with particular social groups.”146 According to Lawoti, a 
shift in adjusting ethnic identities in a communist revolution is not difficult as class 
oppression and ethnic exclusion overlap. When the two types of grievances are 
capitalized within a single revolution, then the movement becomes powerful.147 
Likewise, Graham argues that class coalition is a weak basis for collective action because 
people are dependent on inter-class networks for daily living, whereas ethnicity is marked 
by distinct social practices that result in more determinate collective action.148 Thus, this 
view implies that if an indigenous group is attracted to a class struggle, then the class 
struggle becomes more powerful, but may also change its course.  
According to Mansfield and Snyder, democratization brings new social groups 
and classes onto the political stage.149 The failure of the 1990 Constitution caused ethno 
politics and ethno development to emerge as a new paradigm.150 Prachanda was able to 
exploit the situation when Nepal was witnessing a rise of ethnic grievances. After the 
inception of democracy in 1990, the newly formed indigenous organizations required a 
strong platform to voice their demands. As the CPN(M) leadership raised indigenous 
related issues like language equality, recognition of self-determination rights, declaration 
of autonomous ethnic regions, support to ending Hindu state and Hindu caste chauvinism, 
145 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 11. 
146 Snellinger, “The Repertoire of Scientific Organization,” 73.  
147 Lawoti, “Ethnic Dimension of Maoist Insurgencies,” 136. 
148 Graham, “People’s War,” 242. 
149 Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and War,” 387. 
150 Bhattachan, “Ethnopolitics and Ethnodevelopment,” 36. 
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the indigenous groups were convinced to join the struggle. The shift to ethnic issues 
occurred politically in 1998 after two years of the struggle.151 
The CPN(M) also garnered popular support by establishment of local committees, 
which were given authority to include policies for social reform—agriculture, land-
reform, industry, finance, infrastructure development, education, health, social welfare, 
caste, women to name a few. In some areas, the CPN(M) commissioned “people’s 
governments” and “people’s court” that served as the de facto political authority. The 
Maoists slogans of equal rights for women, an end to caste oppression and exploitation, 
distribution of land, and provisions for raising living standards was an apparent reason for 
popular support in rural areas.   
Furthermore, George Graham argues that CPN(M) used the strategy of spreading 
fear as a powerful means of control.152 He claims that the CPN(M) use of indirect 
coercion and intimidation tactics, which used sporadic acts of violence and use of threat, 
ensured cooperation from the local people. During the insurgency, the Maoists abducted 
and kidnapped a large number of people, which according to INSEC records amounted to 
85,185 victims.153 Many abductees were released, but some of these people joined the 
movement voluntarily or under pressure after they had been indoctrinated. 
In addition, the CPN(M) leadership emphasized the use of mass media for 
attracting local people to their cause. Cultural programs were the most important and 
appealing form of propaganda, which included songs, dances, dramas, poems. They also 
used radio, newspapers, and pamphlets as other means of media communication. In some 
areas they even covertly established their own Frequency Modulation (FM) stations. 
Amongst all various strategies applied by CPN(M) to garner popular support, the 
adoption of the ethnic line became the most effective. The ethnic line increased its 
151 Bhattachan, “Ethnopolitics and Ethnodevelopment,” 49. 
152 Graham, “People’s War,” 238. 
153 Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari, “Violent Conflict and Change: Costs and Benefits of the 
Maoist Rebellion in Nepal,” in The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty First Century, 
eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (New York: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, 2010), 
310. 
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organization and created a cleavage within a democratic political party by infusing it with 
identity issues. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The Maoist insurgency, which was waged by the CPN(M) in 1996, expanded and 
posed a threat to the unstable government. The CPN(M) leadership led the insurgency 
with a pragmatic approach and exploited the available political opportunities. The 
leadership did not adopt a dogmatic Maoist approach and was able to strike a balance in 
the political and social mobilization in response to the changing internal dynamics of the 
state. The leadership formulated strategies that best fit the organization, and adopted 
strategies that allowed a political approach, through which the leadership’s tangible goals 
could be communicated. The CPN(M) leadership raised identity issues that elevated this 
group’s strength. Thus, CPN(M) leadership applied a military and political approach 
while considering public support.  
The CPN(M) is a crucial political actor as it falls within the “big three” political 
parties in current Nepalese politics. The CPN(M) has reshaped Nepalese politics and 
created a new dimension as it has transformed the socio-political and cultural landscape 
of Nepal. The next chapter will make an analysis of the two insurgencies that have been 
described earlier. It will analyze the variables to find practical adaptations that account 





IV. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SL AND THE CPN(M) 
No political party can possibly lead a great revolutionary movement to 
victory unless it possesses revolutionary theory and knowledge of history 
and has a profound grasp of the practical movement.154 
‒Mao Tse-tung 
This chapter will compare two insurgencies, the Shining Path or Sendero 
Luminoso (SL) in Peru and the insurgency in Nepal waged by the Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoists), CPN(M), to demonstrate their leadership approaches. The approaches 
will be based on variables like organizational resources—leadership, ideology, and 
popular support. The variables will demonstrate that one type of leadership developed on 
a cult of personality, applied a dogmatic military approach, and adopted violent approach 
in “elimination of class enemies,” whereas the other leadership style developed around 
experienced and moderate communists, applied “progressive ideology,” and embraced 
grievances of the indigenous people. This chapter will argue that one leadership style was 
better able to cope with challenges, which allowed the movement to survive. The chapter 
will facilitate an understanding of the two leaders’ variation in pragmatic approaches by 
analyzing whether the leadership was able to exploit opportunities.  
To understand the approaches, it is necessary to consider the definitions of 
pragmatic and leadership. Pragmatic is defined as “dealing with matters in accordance 
with practical rather than theoretical considerations or general principles; aiming at what 
is achievable rather than ideal.”155 Some scholars define leadership as the act of making a 
difference, which may occur in different ways but not limited to 
… changing a failed strategy or revamping a languishing organization. … 
[Leadership] requires us to make an active choice among plausible 
alternatives, and it depends on bringing others along, on mobilizing them 
154 J. A. Kortze, “Party Structure and People’s War” (master’s thesis, Graduate and Research 
Committee of Lehigh University, 2011), 12. 
155 Online Oxford English Dictionary, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/149289?redirectedFrom=pragmatic#eid. 
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to get the job done. Leadership is at its best when the vision is strategic, 
the voice persuasive, and the results tangible.”156 
From the aforementioned definitions, a pragmatic leader devises strategies that 
are tangible, rather than lingering in failed strategies.  
This chapter will demonstrate that the two insurgencies’ styles of leadership apply 
pragmatic approaches unevenly, resulting in the different outcomes. The SL style of 
leadership relied on the cult of personality, which lacked a pragmatic approach and 
missed opportunities. This resulted in the collapse of the organization. In contrast, the 
CPN(M) style of leadership was more pragmatic and exploited available political 
opportunities. The CPN(M) leadership style conceived a compromise and negotiated for a 
political process in order to legitimize its organization. Thus, the chapter demonstrates 
that one leadership style was more effective than the other. This chapter will analyze 
pragmatic approaches on issues like decision and organization control, ideological 
strategies, unity of effort, negotiations, and gaining legitimacy.  
A. DECISION AND ORGANIZATION CONTROL 
Crenshaw argues that decisions of leaders in a hierarchical organization are 
critical as it is the leaders’ perception of resources, opportunities, threats, and decisions to 
react that determines the outcomes of a campaign.157 She argues that operational decision 
making is conducted by small groups for security and maximum efficiency, but adds that 
decisions should be conducted in face-to-face discussions rather than handed down 
through an impersonalized hierarchy. As both the groups had a hierarchical organization, 
this section will compare the two insurgencies’ leadership on three accounts—decision 
committee, experience, and timing for initiating a people’s war. 
  
156 Maryann Glynn and Heather Jamerson, “Principled Leadership: A Framework for Action,” 
Leading with Values: Positivity, Virtue, and High Performance, eds. Edward D. Hess and Kim S. Cameron 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 156. 
157 Crenshaw, “Organizational Approach,” 466‒473. 
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First, the SL leadership consolidated the decision-making process, but it 
constrained itself from seeking advice. Its Permanent Bureau of the Central Committee, 
the highest level of leadership, was highly compact, consisting of three members,158 
Guzman, Augusto La Torre Carrasco, and Elena Iparraguirre. Guzman’s wife, Carrasco, 
alias Norah, served as the second-in-command of the organization, and after her death in 
1988, Guzman married Iparraguirre and made her the second-in-command.159 SL’s other 
top-ranking members wanted familial connections to be abandoned, but Guzman solely 
“fantasized about being alone, surrounded by women in the Political Bureau.”160 
Guzman had ideological differences with Norah,161 and it is further speculated that 
Norah was killed internally for her disagreements. This confirms that whoever had 
disagreements with Guzman knew the consequences. Furthermore, as Guzman was the 
founder of the organization, there was no one to challenge his leadership from within the 
organization.  
Second, the leadership instigated an armed struggle even though its members 
lacked experience in national politics. The leadership members were university educated 
and had participated only in provincial university politics.162 Degregori argues that 
leadership and mid-level Senderista commanders consisted mainly of professors, 
university students, and teachers.163 Crenshaw also notes that the SL leadership consisted 
mainly of radical intellectuals, composed mainly of students, who were led by a 
philosophy professor.164 This suggests that Guzman’s personalized cult supported by 
immature leaders lacked experience in national politics necessary to advance the conflict 
with military and political approaches simultaneously.  
  
158 Degregori, How Difficult It Is to Be God, 27. 
159 Jaymie Patricia Heilman, “Family Ties: The Political Path Genealogy of Shining Path’s Comrade 
Norah,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 29, no. 2 (2010): 155. 
160 Heilman, “Family Ties,” 159. 
161 Guzman, “Exclusive Comments,” 57. 
162 Marks and Palmer, “Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics,” 110.  
163 Degregori, How Difficult It Is to Be God, 114. 
164 Crenshaw, “Organizational Approach,” 472. 
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Third, the SL leadership’s selection of timing to take up arms at the exact moment 
the military government handed power to the elected government was regressive. At this 
point, the legislative branch had a “sizeable contingent from the legal Marxist Left.”165 
Furthermore, due to the reform policy by the military government, the peasants were 
already experiencing a shift in distribution of power and wealth.166 Cynthia McClintock 
documents that large landholdings were transferred to peasants in Ayacucho.167 As such, 
the SL leader did not provide the state any opportunity to bring about changes through 
transition. For SL, “electoral democracy was merely window dressing for the 
bureaucratic-capitalist state.”168 
In contrast, the CPN(M) leader, a hardliner, had strong control over his 
organization, but its leadership was influenced by moderate communists. The nine-
member Politburo was assisted by 25-member Central Committee. A number of the key 
figures of the CPN(M) leadership had participated in national politics in an open 
forum.169 In the 1991 general elections, the UPFN had nine members of 205 in the 
parliament,170 making it the third largest party in parliament. Nepali Congress secured 
110 members and the Nepal Communist Party (UML) secured 69. The UPFN members 
included one from the Eastern region (Siraha), four from the Central region (Ramechhap, 
Kavrepalanchowk, Lalitpur, and Chitwan), four from the Mid-west region (Rukkum, 
Humla, and Rolpa x 2). UPFN later joined the CPN(M). This suggests that the CPN(M) 
leadership was assisted by members who had some experience in handling issues at the 
national level.   
165 Gustavo Gorriti Ellenbogen, “Latin America’s Internal Wars,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 1 
(1991): 93, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jod/summary/v002/2.1gorriti.html. 
166 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 187. 
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Politics 37, no. 1 (October 1984): 49, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010306. 
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170 Anup K. Pahari, “‘People’s War’ in Nepal and India,” in The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: 
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The CPN(M) leadership initiated the armed struggle when Nepal had already 
witnessed six years of an unprogressive transitional period. The 1990 democracy had 
generated optimism from an “ethnicization of the state,” but little was being done to shift 
to an inclusive democracy.171 Also, the CPN(M) initiated the conflict in the mid-western 
region of Nepal, where much leftist activism had occurred since the 1950s.172 Likewise, 
western Nepal was a stronghold of revolutionary communists.173 The Magars, an 
indigenous group, who were affiliated with communism, dominated the area, though 
other higher-class society controlled the resources. The Magars were also a warrior 
group, who had a legacy of skillful fighting during the unification campaign of Nepal. 
This illustrates that the armed struggle was initiated where a mass was already “primed” 
by the state. Also, the CPN(M) leadership exploited the skills of the Magars. 
Furthermore, Prachanda was not a founder of the CPN(M), but rather he was elevated to 
the post of the chairman. This implied that the leadership post could be challenged on the 
basis of competition, merit, and experience.  
B. IDEOLOGICAL STRATEGIES 
Leaders of an organization play a crucial role in balancing incentives to maintain 
the organization’s viability. Citing James Q. Wilson, Crenshaw argues, “The fundamental 
purpose of any political organization is to maintain itself,” where survival is the minimal 
goal for an organization.174 According to her, people may not actually join an 
organization for fulfilling ideological goals, as it is a “tenuous connection” when 
ideology is ambiguous. It is leaders who manipulate the constraints and opportunities 
created by these non-political incentives for people’s commitment.  
171 Sijapati, “In Pursuit of Recognition,” 161. 
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The ideological commitment was the central focus of SL members,175 and the 
commitment was believed to be “fiercely ideological.”176 Degregori argues that unlike in 
other Latin American states, the Peruvian armed forces and the SL “treated the civilian 
population with equal brutality,” affecting the indigenous peasants mainly.177 
McClintock argues that all revolutions in Latin America were successful because they 
were “broad-based and ideologically tolerant,”178 but the SL did not assign much 
importance to the broader section of the population. The main core of SL’s military 
strength consisted mainly of rural youth, considered an energetic and vibrant mass. SL 
leadership’s strategy attracted some peasants mainly of the highlands, but did not 
consider the coastal peasants and urban citizens.   
Guzman envisioned the scope of the revolution not only to Peru, but also to a 
larger Latin America to include the Quechua-speaking peoples of Bolivia, Columbia, 
Ecuador, Argentina, and Chile. Though the SL insurgency occurred during the Cold War 
period, the establishment of a socialist Latin America was quite an intangible objective as 
Guzman never sought assistance from international leftists, and he even condemned 
international leftists. The armed struggle continued in isolation.  
Guzman used the language of violence and power against the masses as his 
ideological strategy. Citing Guzman, Degregori notes the relationship between the party 
and the SL:  
The masses must be taught with convincing facts. You must drive home 
ideas into them. ... The masses in Peru need the direction of a Communist 
Party, we hope that with more revolutionary theory and practice, with 
more armed actions, with more popular war, with more power, we may 
arrive at the very heart of the class and of the people, and really win them 
over. What for? To serve them, that is what we want.179 
175 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 196. 
176 Ibid., 84. 
177 Degregori, How Difficult It Is to Be God, 22. 
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Guzman institutionalized his Gonzalo Thought through newspapers, 
indoctrinations, or executions.180 He adopted a policy of “propaganda by the deed,” 
which was rounding up the traitors and opponents, subjecting them to trials, and 
executing them publicly. Crenshaw remarks that “propaganda of the deed” are acts of 
terrorism as they are different from organized collective violence that accompany strikes, 
demonstrations, riots, and other expressions of mass discontent.181 This suggests that SL 
leadership applied an inflexible ideology that was based on violence and terrorism.  
Turning to CPN(M), Sean DeBlieck notes that Maoism is malleable and remarks 
that the CPN(M) leadership adopted strategies to adapt to the changing environment.182 
Crenshaw argues that ideological doctrines are rarely as well formulated as ideas are 
because they are borrowed loosely from other theorists.183 The CPN(M) leadership 
followed people’s war theories unevenly as it was a “divergent practice.”184 The 
leadership’s flexible ideological approach that exploited pre-existing group affiliations, 
benefited the CPN(M) in terms of expanding militancy and cohesion. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that CPN(M) did not have an explicit and dogmatic ideology. The CPN(M) 
leadership conducted a military and political approach simultaneously. Applying two 
approaches gave the CPN(M) an alternative to make a bargain with the government. As 
the CPN(M) leadership perceived military victory was impossible, the CPN(M) ended the 
time-consuming armed conflict and entered into mainstream politics.  
C. UNITY OF EFFORT 
Weinstein argues that a rebel organization performs better and benefits from 
cooperation and specialization with other organizations.185 In El Salvador, for example, 
the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) was formed by the unification of 
180 Christina Meyer, Underground Voices: Insurgent Propaganda in El Salvador, Nicaragua and 
Peru (R-3299) (Arlington, VA: Rand, 1991), 24. 
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five rebel groups. The unification posed such a threat to the national government that the 
conflict ended after a negotiated peace accord between the FMLN and the Salvadoran 
government in 1992.186 Now the FMLN is a major legal political party. Likewise, an 
example of unity of effort was demonstrated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
which had the strength of 1,000 members in 1925. The CCP’s association with the 
Kuomintang, though it was brief, expanded its strength to 59,000 in 1926, and enabled 
them to fight against the warlords and the Japanese imperialists.187  
The SL never formulated strategies for trying to unite with other leftist groups. 
They rather confronted the leftists, which proved to be counterproductive for the 
organization. The anti-left violence focused on assassinating activists from mainly two 
legally recognized leftist groups—the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) 
and United Left (Izquirda Unida, or IU). Though the assassinations of prominent 
Peruvian leftist figures were small in number, they had a major impact on the way the SL 
was perceived at home and abroad as some leftists began to cooperate with state security 
forces.188 SL leader wanted to remain as the idealist communist leader and rejected group 
unity as other leftists were considered revisionists. As Crenshaw notes, “unity is much 
more difficult to preserve when there are rivals,”189 and Guzman must have perceived 
that unity is difficult to preserve in leftist organizations.   
Likewise, Guzman never tried to form an alliance with the Tupac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), which was established in 1982 for fighting for the 
same objective to destroy the standing regime.190 Competition between two or more rebel 
groups increases terrorist incidents.191 Thus, the struggle between the MRTA and SL for 
the same resources in the same environment led to an increase in terrorist activities. The 
186 Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge: 
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SL attacked and expelled MRTA organizations whenever they came in contact with 
them, especially in the coca growing areas.192 The leadership must have perceived that 
unity could divert the focus of the armed struggle, as it might offer alternatives to the 
direction which SL spearheaded. The SL could have gained some of its objectives if its 
leader had devised strategies for unity between leftist groups. 
On the other hand, the CPN(M) leader favored unity and was able to lead the 
party as one powerful organization. As described earlier, communists have a tendency to 
split; the CPN(M) leadership succeeded in avoiding the “break-up disease.”193 As “all 
leadership takes place through communication of ideas to the minds of others,”194 so at 
times of contentious issues, Prachanda was tactful in balancing the views of different 
leaders and factions, and incorporating issues in official party line. It is speculated that 
Baburam Bhattaria propounded a line of joining the political mainstream, which was 
adopted in the Chunwang plenary in 2005 in order to prevent a breakaway.195 Prachanda 
cleverly adopted Baburam’s line in order to preserve his leadership in the 
organization.196  
Some scholars argue that “leadership is not a position but rather a relationship,” as 
leaders should reach out to their members and make connections not only within their 
organization but also to other organization members beyond their organizational unit.197 
It is viewed that the response of leaders to others has a transformative impact. There was 
no other rebel group with which CPN(M) could compete in Nepal, but CPN(M) 
leadership attempted to unite other revolutionary groups abroad. Prachanda is believed to 
have facilitated the merger of India’s People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist 
192Carlos A. De Izcue, “Peru’s Shining Path and MRTA Analyzed with the Manwaring Paradigm,” 
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Coordination of Committee (MCC).198 Furthermore, in 2004 Prachanda facilitated 
bringing the scattered Maoists of India into forming the Communist Party of India, 
CPI(Maoist),199 which has become a threat to India’s internal security.  
According to Waldman, left-wing terrorists lack support and need to develop 
international connections.200 The CPN(M) leaders took assistance from various 
communist groups in India and exploited the advantage of the open and porous borders 
with India. The CPN(M) conducted their activities and took shelter across the borders. 
International communist groups like Revolutionary International Movement (RIM), 
Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organization of South Asia 
(CCOMPOSA), provided moral, physical, and intellectual support, and increased the 
Maoist influence.201 It is also speculated that the Maoists received training, weapons, and 
ammunition from the Indian Maoist groups. 
D. LEVERAGE ON STATE’S ACTIONS 
Thomas Hobbes stated that it is in human nature that quarrels are caused by 
“competition,” “diffidence,” and “glory,” and accordingly, competition causes men to 
“invade for gain.”202 The SL leadership considered competition with the Peruvian armed 
forces in terms of military power as Guzman only applied a military approach. According 
to the 1984 Human Rights Watch, Peru’s military repression was criticized as the 
“abdication of democratic authority”203 and was recorded as having the worst human 
rights violations in the world.204 Guzman did not capitalize on the opportunities 
198 Munni, “Bringing the Maoists down from the Hills,” 321. 
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presented by Peruvian armed forces’ repression; rather, the SL got entangled in 
indiscriminate killings of non-combatants. 
Though Huntington argues that domestic wars encourage civil-military relations 
and demand subjective civilian control;205 the Peruvian armed forces were out of civilian 
control, which reduced the army’s autonomy and held the military accountable for human 
rights abuses that created a rift between the military and the civilian authorities.206 In 
addition, a rift existed within the military in confronting the SL members—whether to 
continue with repressive measures or adopt developmental measures. Similarly, when 
President Fujimori’s autogolpe of April 5, 1992, dissolved constitutional rule and 
centralized economic and political decision power in the hands of the executive branch 
and the armed forces,207 it presented a political opportunity to the SL. The removal of 
democratic checks and balances in congress and the judiciary created a rift between the 
executive branch and other institutions of government. The SL leadership did not exploit 
the opportunity to appeal to the international community nor did the SL attempt to 
associate itself with the “abducted” democratic authorities. For example, in El Salvador, 
the FMLN had leveraged the abusive government policies into international sympathy for 
its cause.208 Though the United States had supported the Salvadorian armed forces, 
Washington was embarrassed by the persistent human rights violations by the military 
and caused the United States to initiate negotiations.209 
By contrast, as the Nepalese Army (NA) prevented the use of heavy repression; 
the Maoists used selective violence rather than indiscriminate violence.210 The NA had 
sufficient experience in United Nations peace keeping missions, and so the army was 
quite aware of the “winning hearts and minds” strategy as opposed to pure repression.211 
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NA was deployed only after its barracks was targeted. As the Human Rights Watch was 
active in Nepal, human rights violation cases in Nepal were low as compared to Peru. 
Weinstein argues that the CPN(M)’s leadership was cautious in not escalating the 
violence, which was marked by “selective violence with attacks on police posts, military 
barracks, and political leaders as their dominant strategy.”212 Their actions did not 
generate widespread resistance. Nepal’s government was responsible for 63 percent of 
those killed in the insurgency; the Maoists were responsible for 37 percent.213 Thus, from 
a comparison of the number of deaths in the two conflicts, it is clear that Nepal’s 
insurgency did not escalate as much as the insurgency in Peru.  
E. NEGOTIATIONS 
Generally, two conflicting parties conduct negotiations when in a “hurting 
stalemate” position. Each of the parties has its own objectives for negotiations. States 
negotiate as a “potential exit strategy” as means to manage terrorist violence and also 
when the rebel group’s cause is gaining legitimacy.214 Insurgents use political 
organizations as a cover for fulfilling their goals, which “aims at achieving strategic goals 
such as acceptance, or tactical goals such as cease fire.”215 However, progress in 
negotiations can be made only when there is a convergence of both parties’ interests and 
political will.  
The SL pursued its goal only militarily without trying to seek political means to 
end the conflict. Galula documents that “a revolutionary war is 20 percent military action 
and 80 percent political.”216 The SL decision not to negotiate does correspond to 
Cronin’s argument that most terrorist groups choose not to negotiate, and only 18 percent 
of terrorist groups have actually negotiated.217 The leadership was confident that they 
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could capture state power with its guerillas and never opted for negotiations.218 Peru’s 
government did not call on the SL leadership for negotiations, nor did the SL leadership 
declare a unilateral ceasefire. The SL leadership thus missed the opportunity for gaining 
through negotiations. Unlike the CPN(M), the SL could not fulfill certain covert tactical 
goals, and neither could it fulfill some of its objectives.  
The CPN(M) opted ceasefires for covert purposes. The first ceasefire in 2001 was 
initiated as a “cover for military operations,”219 or as a “strategic pause” to advance the 
campaign to a higher level.220 During this ceasefire, the Maoists consolidated and trained 
their guerillas to launch an offensive against the Nepalese Army, and restructured their 
“People’s Army” into a “People’s Liberation Army (PLA),”221 which entailed the United 
People’s Revolutionary Council. After the formation of the PLA, the Maoists claimed 
that they had achieved the phase of “strategic equilibrium.” In doing so, the Maoists 
prepared for a larger struggle against the state. After combating the Nepalese Army, a 
position of “hurting stalemate” was reached. 
Some scholars argue that after three incidents in 2001, including the royal 
massacre on June 1; the formation of CCOMPOSA on July 1; and the September 11 
terrorist attack in the United States,  India decided to take an aggressive position against 
the Nepali Maoists in controlling the spread of Maoism, as it was alarming India as well. 
The CPN(M) continued its offensive against the NA, and enjoyed covert support from 
Indian territory for some time. The CPN(M) launched its offensive against the NA in 
November 2001 and intensified the attacks. This also demonstrates the calculated risk 
taken by the CPN(M) leadership. 
The CPN(M) initiated the second peace talks in January 2003 for their own 
advantage for three reasons. First, the CPN(M) leadership wanted to reinvigorate the 
organization, as they started lacking resources and started facing organizational problems. 
Financially, it was becoming difficult to sustain the CPN(M) organization. 
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Organizationally, NA had captured and killed a large number of Maoist leaders, cadres, 
and sympathizers. Also, the strength of NA had expanded and this affected the 
recruitment for Maoist cadres.   
Second, the Maoist leaders wanted to pressure the government to fulfill their 
demands. Their preconditions for the negotiations were that the state should withdraw the 
“terrorist tag,” remove the bounty that was placed on the heads of top Maoist leaders,222 
and to restructure Nepal by a Constituent Assembly. Though the United States did not 
designate the CPN(M) a foreign terrorist organization, it had included the CPN(M) on the 
“terrorism exclusion list” since 2003.223 The word “terrorism” is “one of the most 
powerfully condemnatory words in the English language” that serves as a delegitimizing 
insult.224 Moreover, as terrorism is cross border in nature, the multilateral and 
international community could react to combat terrorism. Perceiving the consequence, the 
CPN(M) leaders initiated the move just after they had assassinated the chief of the Armed 
Police Force to demonstrate their capabilities. 
Third, the Maoists entered the second ceasefire agreement to appeal to the 
Nepalese people and the international community, insinuating that they had favored a 
way out for solving the conflict through dialogue. The CPN(M) leadership succeeded in 
buying time, and achieved its tactical goal of providing grounds for isolating the 
monarch.225 This was important as it clearly defined the demands of the Maoists and 
paved way for future negotiations. Cronin argues that rebel groups that negotiate have a 
longer average life span than those who do not negotiate.226 According to her, 
negotiations are prolonged and take several sittings, and groups who have negotiated 
span between 20 and 25 years. However, her theory seems not to fit in the case of 
CPN(M), which negotiated and had a similar life span to that of the SL, which rejected 
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negotiations. Thus, the CPN(M) leadership proved that they could innovate and adapt to 
counter the challenges. 
F. LEGITIMACY 
Huntington argues that in class and ideological conflicts, people could choose and 
change sides as the key question was “Which side are you on?”227 An insurgency is a 
struggle of the masses; therefore, it is important to devise strategies for gaining local 
support and to prevent the local support from changing sides. As leaders wish for 
ensuring the viability of an organization,228 whoever retains the popular support is more 
likely to come out victorious. Winning popular support means gaining legitimacy. 
The SL leadership was unable to build consensus in retaining the support of the 
peasants. Rather Guzman started losing credibility as his organization exercised coercive 
actions against the public. According to Stanley Milgram, if obedience to authority serves 
a malevolent cause “then it is transformed into a heinous sin.”229 As the SL began 
imposing its ideology-based policies on the indigenous peasants and diverging from the 
local people’s concern and interest, the SL started to face resistance from rondas 
campesinas. The SL leadership expected a general uprising to support the SL, but instead 
it witnessed a backlash. The first “strategic defeat” came from the peasants, who were 
supposed to be their “natural ally.”230 
Guzman believed in violence as he stated in his interview, “Revolutionary 
violence is what allows us to resolve fundamental contradictions by means of an army, 
through people’s war.”231 Only 17 percent of SL victims were members of the police or 
military; most were unarmed civilians.232 All such horrendous actions and the SL 
leader’s perception of all international communist states as revisionists suggest that 
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Guzman never thought of legitimizing his group. This prevented the group from gaining 
any legitimacy domestically and from the international community. Rather, the atrocities 
drew international attention and sparked a national Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
process during 2001‒2003.  
By contrast, the CPN(M) leadership implemented strategies that would allow its 
group to gain legitimacy. Citing Rothschild, Sijapati argues that ethnic identity, “unlike 
other emblems of personal identity, … has the capacity to arouse and to engage the most 
intense, deep, and private emotional sentiments.”233 While other democratic political 
party leaders of Nepal did not exploit the opportunity of raising the indigenous people’s 
issues, the Maoist leadership raised the ethnic issues more forcefully than any other 
political mainstream,234 and the identity issues received more attention and legitimacy.235 
Furthermore, the CPN(M) gained some degree of legitimacy from the 
international community by allowing international organizations to operate in areas under 
the Maoists’ de facto control, demanding election of a constitution through a Constituent 
Assembly (though parliamentary parties were against such demands). The leadership also 
showed readiness to engage in dialogue with the United Nations, thus creating grounds 
for attaining legitimacy.236 Moreover, the international community was against the king’s 
takeover of autocratic powers in February 1, 2005. The CPN(M) exploited the situation 
and started forming an alliance with other democratic parties in order to isolate the 
monarch, resulting in an agreement between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the 
CPN(M) in November 2005.  
So, the CPN(M) leadership pragmatically started alienating the monarch, who 
commanded the army. The CPN(M)’s approach convinced the international community 
that the CPN(M) favored peace and was not a terrorist group. The leadership availed 
itself of the opportunity to enter into competitive politics, which indicated a permanent 
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shift in their ideology. Thus, the CPN(M) emerging triumphant was not by military 
victory, but “owing to political foresight and strategies.”237 
G. CONCLUSION 
The differences in the outcomes of the two insurgencies lies in the variation in the 
leaderships’ rationale for utilizing organizational resources, including leadership, 
ideology, and popular support. The SL leadership was autocratic and followed a dogmatic 
ideological approach in fulfilling its goals and employed extensive violence towards 
peasants. As the SL leader believed in power, he continued his struggle with military 
dominance and never called for negotiations. The group missed the opportunities that it 
could have derived if the organization had engaged in political approaches. The SL’s 
leadership proved to be a weakness as it undermined the ability of the organization to 
make rational decisions and to operate in the absence of the leader. As such, the SL 
collapsed after the capture of its leader. 
The CPN(M) leadership adopted various strategies and exploited available 
opportunities. The CPN(M) exploited ethnic grievances and shifted the class struggle to 
ethnic lines to gain popular support. As the international community raised its voice 
against terrorism, the CPN(M) sought alternatives. In 2005, when the monarch took 
autocratic rule, the CPN(M) took advantage and formed an alliance with other democratic 
parties and joined the political mainstream. The CPN(M) even won the general elections 
in 2008. Thus, this chapter has demonstrated that the two insurgencies had different 
trajectories mainly because Guzman’s individualistic leadership prevented the SL from 
taking a pragmatic approach. By contrast, the CPN(M) applied military and political 
approaches and sought pragmatic alternatives. The choice of the insurgent leadership to 
retain a strategic flexibility for engaging in the political process appears to be the primary 
reason for the different outcomes. 
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Now that the variation of pragmatic approaches applied in the two insurgencies 
has been established, the next chapter addresses the major findings from the comparison 




V. FINDINGS OF ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND 
CONCLUSION 
Insurgencies have posed increasingly complex problems for weak states, which 
find themselves challenged by violent conflict. Since most insurgencies use terrorist 
tactics, such armed struggles have great significance at present. Insurgencies are often 
studied in order to make recommendations on foreign and defense policies in general, and 
on military interventions and counter-insurgent operations in particular. Moreover, 
insurgencies are better understood when multiple cases can be examined. This chapter 
will analyze the two insurgencies initiated in Peru and Nepal to enhance the broader 
understanding of insurgencies. 
This chapter will demonstrate a general trend of such insurgencies and their 
impact on a state, a society, and a rebel group. The major findings of the research will 
facilitate in demonstrating a general trend. Furthermore, the findings will lay a foundation 
for the recommendations section that will inform policy makers in designing 
counterinsurgent strategies to end conflicts. As insurgency and terrorism overlap, these 
recommendations may similarly overlap in counter strategies. The chapter will also make 
concluding remarks on the research that will provide an overall picture of the thesis. 
A. MAJOR FINDINGS 
This section will analyze the two insurgencies, taking into account three main 
actors: a rebel group, a state, and society. It will attempt to examine the interaction 
between these actors during an insurgency. It will also touch upon the significance of 
external actors during an insurgency. In doing so, it will answer a few basic questions 
concerning how insurgency is driven, why terrorism is incorporated into an insurgency, 
when violence escalates, how ethnicity affects insurgency, who becomes a major victim 
in a conflict, what modifications are applied by insurgents, and how insurgency ends.  
Some scholars claim that class-based ideology drives socio-revolutionary conflict. 
However, it is observed that ideology did not have a significant role in either case 
examined in this thesis. Though the insurgent leaders in Peru and Nepal employed 
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Marxist class-based ideology, neither movement was class based. Ideology may be a 
driving tool for a conflict only at the beginning. Galula argues that the importance of a 
cause for an insurgency, which becomes an essential factor at the outset of an insurgency, 
gradually decreases in importance as the insurgents gain strength.238 The war itself then 
becomes a driving tool, which forces the population to take sides. It suggests that 
members in an organization may have “only a slight connection with the organization’s 
ideological objectives.”239 If an organization focuses only on its ideological objectives, it 
could limit the organization’s survival: “if a political system leans too far in either 
direction, then disaster awaits.”240 This can be assumed in the SL case as they leaned too 
much on the extreme left.  
Since class-based ideology is insignificant, insurgencies invariably incorporate 
terrorism in their campaigns to form a counter-state.241 There is no universally accepted 
definition of terrorism, but in general, terrorism is political in nature, involving 
“commission of outrageous acts designed to precipitate political change.”242 Insurgencies 
are asymmetric warfare, which tend to meld with other forms of conflict like terrorism, 
ethnic struggles, separatism, class struggles, and ideological conflict.243 Thus, political 
violence is the common factor in terrorism and insurgency as “terrorism often overlaps 
with guerilla violence.”244 This makes insurgency a complex and dangerous threat to a 
state and society. Though both the movements examined here initiated a people’s war for 
social change, both the insurgencies employed terrorism violence in varying ways. It 
demonstrates that insurgent leaders are likely to take up terrorism at some point. This 
implies that a group, which lacks power and numerical strength as compared to the 
conventional state forces, will employ the dictate: “terrorism is a weapon of the weak.” 
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Huntington argues that terrorism is a weapon, however, which is effective not against the 
strong, but against the vulnerable.245  
When military force is deployed against an insurgency, violence escalates, which 
results in a higher rate of killings. In most cases, the state police are initially mobilized. 
Nevertheless, when the situation is beyond their control, a state resorts to military force. 
The conflicts in Peru and Nepal have demonstrated that killings reach their peak after the 
mobilization of military force. In the case of Peru, Figure 2 demonstrates that violence 
skyrocketed in 1983‒1984 after the Peruvian armed forces were deployed in December 
1982. According to Degregori, if the SL had a “thousand eyes and thousand ears” to 
coerce the population, then the military was engaged in “blind repression.” With regard 
to Nepal, Figure 3 demonstrates that violence reached its peak in 2002 after the 
deployment of the NA in November 2001. Similarly, in the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
case, both warring parties seemed to validate and necessitate “an aggressive response, 
which in turn stimulated counter-response, and so on.”246 This suggests that when state 
military forces are deployed, aggressiveness is unleashed in both warring parties due to 
the “revenge” impulse that results in a high rate of killings. Though the killing reached its 
peak after the deployment of military forces, the numbers of those killed by the two 
insurgent groups varied. Thus, the rebel leaders’ attitude drives the aggressiveness. 
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Figure 2.  Number of deaths and disappearances reported to the truth 
commission, Peru, 1980‒2000.247 
 
 
Figure 3.  Reported killings related to the people’s war, Nepal, 1996‒2006.248  
247 Degregori, How Difficult It Is to Be God, 23. 
248 Einsiedel, Malone, and Pradhan, Nepal in Transition, 20.  
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The insurgent leadership’s attitude towards indigenous groups impacts collective 
resistance, which results in the differing outcomes of insurgencies. Class-based rebellions 
will attempt to attract and mobilize marginalized indigenous groups by promising to 
address indigenous people’s demands. In Peru, although the SL leader belonged to 
mestizo (mixed race), he and his group initially reflected well the indigenous Indian 
groups’ grievances. However, as the party became antagonistic to local culture and 
traditions, the rebel group became alienated from these indigenous groups. By contrast, 
Nepal’s Maoists embraced indigenous groups’ issues. Though leaders of both insurgent 
groups did not belong to the indigenous groups of their respective countries, the CPN(M) 
had more indigenous people in its leadership than did the SL.249 Nevertheless, it may be 
noted that the proportion of indigenous people in the leadership may have affected the 
variation in attitudes between these two insurgent groups and the public support they 
received. The SL faced collective resistance from the indigenous groups in many parts of 
Peru, while the CPN(M) faced collective resistance in one district of the western region, 
but without the involvement of the indigenous group.250 This demonstrates the impact of 
the rebel leadership’s attitude toward the indigenous group, who are affected by the 
overall insurgency.  
The majority of the victims in a conflict are the same group for whom the 
insurgency is allegedly being fought. The insurgencies in both cases seemed to fight for 
the protection of indigenous people. The SL initiated a people’s war to liberate the 
Quechua-speaking people from the Spanish heritage. The national census of 1993 shows 
the Quechua speakers did not even account for 20 percent of the population,251 but they 
accounted for three-fourths of the dead and disappeared.252 Likewise in Nepal, the 
CPN(M) raised the issues of the indigenous people, but it was the Magars, an indigenous 
group, who became victimized the most as they became “cannon fodder.” Of the total 
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casualties in 2000, about 24.2 percent were Magars.253 From 1996 to 2005, of the Maoist 
victims killed who were identified along ethnic and caste lines, 28 percent were 
indigenous, while 40 percent were victims of the state.254 Thus, these findings suggest 
that when a conflict erupts for the cause of any particular group, then the majority of 
deaths fall upon that group. Having examined the significance of indigenous groups as a 
domestic factor related to the outcome of an insurgency, it is now important to consider 
the influence of external actors on outcomes. 
In the present century, insurgent leaders modify their campaign to encompass 
outside support. As has been shown previously, insurgencies tend to apply the three 
magic wands unevenly. Thus, Marks presents a new framework consisting of five 
approaches—mass, political, military, a united front, and international action.255 The SL 
applied mainly the military element without considering outside support. In contrast, the 
CPN(M) leadership applied multiple approaches based on all five elements 
simultaneously.256 This suggests that even home-grown insurgent leaders will attempt to 
fulfill at least some of their objectives by taking into account outside support. This also 
demonstrates the importance of external actors in shaping an insurgency. In doing so, it 
implies that the international community has a significant role in ending a conflict, 
whether to curtail external actors’ support to insurgents or to allow insurgents to garner 
support. 
A conflict could end in many ways, but a political approach that prevents any 
further splintering could be among the best options. Cronin argues that there are six 
patterns of ending campaigns—decapitation (capturing or killing the group’s leader), 
entry of the group into the legitimate political process, achievement of the group’s aim, 
implosion or loss of the group’s popular support, defeat and elimination by brute force, 
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and transition from one form to another.257 The SL ended with decapitation whereas the 
CPN(M) entered into the legitimate political process. Thus, from a state’s point of view, 
the entry of a rebel group into legitimate political process, implosion or loss of the 
group’s popular support, and decapitation could be the best options. How a state could 
achieve these best options depends on the strategies formulated by a state, which will be 
discussed in the next section.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
This section will draw recommendations from research to facilitate a state in 
formulating counterinsurgent strategies for ending a conflict. In most cases, such 
recommendations will prepare military practitioners for effective engagement in 
strategies, operational art, and tactics against insurgencies. Since the variables used for 
the research were leadership, ideology, and popular support, recommendations will focus 
on a state’s counterinsurgent strategies rather than military operations and tactics.  
Counterinsurgent strategy must integrate all elements of national power. Fields 
related to political, security, the judiciary, finance, technology, and the international 
community must be integrated. Integrated approaches insulate any component from 
assuming authoritarian rule and facilitate combating insurgency on the same footing 
through a united front. An integrated approach will be effective if each of the components 
assumes its responsibility and contributes to bringing a society into normalcy. 
Throughout the 1980s, Peru lacked consistency and agreement concerning 
counterinsurgency policy.258 The focus should be population centric to minimize 
insurgents’ exploitation of the local population. As insurgents aim to establish a counter 
state, local security remains a key to restoration of normalcy. Operationally, when 
security forces are employed, civilian components too must be incorporated, where 
shared intelligence among the components becomes equally important.  
Emphasis must be put on improving intelligence as it is a key element in 
combating insurgencies. In this research, two case studies demonstrated that even a small 
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number of individuals can grow to challenge the state if they are committed to making a 
revolution, irrespective of objective conditions. Most states initially employ state police 
and later employ military forces to fight an insurgency. Police efficiency depends on 
force size, competency, loyalty towards the government, and backing from other 
branches of government such as the judiciary. In such environments, intelligence must be 
collected and analyzed from the beginning of an insurgency. Information must be 
coordinated and disseminated in a timely manner. Furthermore, domestic laws should be 
reviewed with prompt adaptation of the judicial system. Judicial powers should be 
provided to intelligence agencies. Analytical intelligence techniques will prevent 
unnecessary deaths, which will generally thwart a state from adapting repressive 
measures.  
State repression or defeating insurgents by brute force may have repercussions 
and the death toll will be high. In Peru, the state’s repressive measures increased human 
rights violations. Sometimes a strategy of over militarization can end a conflict as in Sri 
Lanka, but at the cost of human lives. The military’s defeat of the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009 left nearly 30,000 maimed and over 20,000 Tamil 
civilians killed.259 Therefore, the lesson is to deploy the military if it is cautious in its 
military actions; otherwise, the cost could be heavy in terms of lives lost. Security forces 
deployed should be a neutral force, so that they do not take sides. Also, the ad hoc 
deployment of forces must be avoided; deployment of forces should be integrated into an 
overall strategic approach. Furthermore, security forces must stick to rules of engagement 
and be held accountable for their actions, which may be attained by a mechanism of 
civilian control.   
A state must reform the military to have a civilian control mechanism even in 
times of emergency. In the case of Peru, the democratic government failed to develop 
mechanisms of civilian control and oversight of the military’s behavior, allowing for 
complete military autonomy over counterinsurgency matters.260 This led to a “dirty war,” 
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which led to thousands of killings. In an emergency, controlling the army in terms of the 
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary may be difficult. However, respecting the 
orthodox legal framework and adhering to democratically established rule of law should 
be a general rule. Mechanisms like internal and external control should be exercised 
which could be in the form of a monitoring team, an observer team, human rights 
organizations, civil society, and the media. Such organizations should act impartially and 
not incite other movements.  
Ethnic movements or violent ethnic organizations must be prevented from joining 
rebels during an insurgency. The support of ethnic or indigenous groups could transform 
the nature of an insurgency. Though the insurgent leaderships’ class or caste 
identification did not matter much, the support from indigenous groups could make a 
rebel organization more formidable than a pure class or ideological insurgency. 
Governments should not alienate indigenous groups but rather address their grievances 
and the underlying root problems and causes of these grievances. Therefore, governments 
must win the hearts and minds of indigenous groups by considering socio-economic-
political reform and winning the confidence of the leadership of such groups.   
If the sustenance of violence is partly dependent on key leaders, then drawing 
those leaders toward politics for a more peaceful means will be vital to ending a conflict. 
In the case of Nepal, an opportunity was provided to the CPN(M), as both the state and 
the rebel group negotiated. Also, in the case of the IRA, although the state did not want to 
negotiate initially, ultimately negotiations ended the conflict. This suggests that 
negotiations are one of the peaceful means of ending a conflict. In Peru, just as the SL 
leadership never sought negotiations, the state also never provided an opportunity to 
negotiate. The state believed in repression. Therefore, from a public perspective, to 
maintain credibility and confidence, a state must bring the insurgent leadership to 
negotiation terms. Furthermore, a state must carefully analyze insurgent groups’ tangible 
as well as covert objectives for negotiating. However, if peaceful means is unattainable, 
other options should be sought for ending conflict.  
Decapitation increases the probability of conflict termination if the insurgent 
leader is a founding member of the insurgent organization. It is likely that there will be 
 71 
no one to challenge leadership of a founding leader. In decapitation, arresting not killing 
a leader may be more effective in damaging a group. First, it reflects that the leader is a 
criminal and so he can be tried publicly in court, which will determine his fate legally. 
Second, interrogation of the leader may provide valuable information on the organization. 
Third, keeping the leader in isolation demoralizes the group. However, sometimes 
arresting a leader may be a disadvantage as the rebel group may use the imprisoned 
leader as a “bargaining chip.” Thus, a state must analyze the types of liability that it could 
face if it opts to capture an insurgent leader.   
Moreover, some states may be unable to implement such means to ending a 
conflict. In particular, newly established democracies may be diverted by internal conflict 
if democracy is not consolidated. In 1992, for example, in response to Western 
government pressure, the Rwanda regime established a multi-party system, which was 
transformed into a coalition government. However, the new political parties were 
ethnically driven, which ultimately led to the genocide in 1994.261 Similarly, both Nepal 
and Peru attained democracy, but were plunged into an armed struggle. Both movements 
challenged the premise as stated by Goodwin and Skocpol, “Ballot box … has proven to 
be the coffin of revolutionary movements.”262 If a newly formed government is not 
geared up to adopt democratic practices, some amount of time and experience is required 
to train the leaders at the earliest—before democracy is declared or immediately after 
declaration of democracy. In such transition cases, “the cure is probably more 
democracy, not less,” and that rules for democracy should be “go fully democratic, or 
don’t go at all.”263  
 
261 Kaplan, “Was Democracy Just a Moment?” 60. 
262 Madhav Joshi, “Between Clientelistic Dependency and Liberal Market Economy: Rural Support 
for the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” in The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First 
Century, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (New York: Routledge Contemporary South Asia 
Series, 2010), 92. 
263 Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and War,” 392. 
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C. CONCLUSION  
Insurgencies are a form of asymmetric conflict, which are initiated to overthrow 
an existing regime. This makes insurgencies a complex and dangerous threat to the 
strategists who must deal with them. Dealing with an insurgent group depends on rebel 
leadership as it plays a vital role in shaping an insurgency. Leaders of rebel groups 
differently manipulate the “oppressed group” and react to a state in trying to transform a 
society and establish new democracy. This was demonstrated in the Shining Path or 
Sendero Luminoso (SL) movement of Peru and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal waged by 
the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN)M. Both groups employed terrorist tactics in trying 
to fulfill their goals. It is argued that terrorists cannot fulfill their strategic objectives.264 
They may be able to fulfill only certain goals. This was demonstrated by the two 
insurgent groups, both of whom were declared terrorists, as they could not establish their 
strategic goal—their envisioned “new democracy.” As the CPN(M) was pragmatic, it was 
successful in fulfilling certain objectives. However, this study illustrated, pragmatic 
approaches adopted by insurgent leaders may fulfill some of the insurgents’ goals. As 
leadership of the two insurgent groups applied approaches unevenly, the outcomes of 
their respective conflicts differed.  
The SL leadership pursued an inflexible ideology in a campaign to capture state 
power. The leadership applied rigid adherence to Maoist ideals and a military approach in 
a people’s war that was initiated in 1980. Moreover, the leadership exercised and 
developed a cult of personality that failed to exploit available opportunities. The SL 
leader, Guzman, believed in defeating the regime militarily and never sought a political 
approach. Furthermore, the insurgents continued to rely on terrorist violence. In fact, Burt 
describes the Shining Path as a “group of demented psychopaths engaged in violence for 
violence’s sake.”265 The act of violence squandered the popular support that the group 
had garnered. Moreover, the leadership continued its campaign in isolation without 
considering the international context. As such, the SL collapsed after the capture of its 
leader in 1992. 
264 English, Terrorism: How to Respond, 112‒113. 
265 Burt, Political Violence, 12. 
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By contrast, CPN(M) leadership demonstrated pragmatic politics in an insurgency 
that was initiated in 1996. The leadership was flexible in ideology and adopted a 
combined military and political approach. The leadership took advantage of political 
opportunities for the organization’s survival, as moderate communists directed and 
assisted the leadership. The CPN(M) leadership exercised adaptability in response to the 
limitations, constraints, and changing environment. Furthermore, the CPN(M) did not 
pursue indiscriminate violence, but rather embraced the indigenous people’s issues. The 
conflict ended after a peace agreement was signed between the state and the CPN(M) in 
2006. The CPN(M) joined political mainstream politics and became victorious in the 
2008 elections. The CPN(M) leadership applied a pragmatic approach, whereas the SL 
leadership applied a dogmatic approach that resulted in the difference of outcomes. The 
study of such rebel leadership approaches can guide policy makers in formulating 
counterinsurgency strategies.  
Counterinsurgency strategies are devised to end a conflict. As leaders of rebel 
groups have personalities guided by various principles, it is a state’s role to study the 
leadership approaches to formulate a viable approach to end a conflict. In most cases, 
insurgencies incorporate terrorism, which causes fear among the population. Therefore, a 
state must focus on bringing the situation to normalcy, which can be achieved by winning 
the hearts and minds of the population. Therefore, states should formulate efficient 
population-centric rather than repressive strategies in countering insurgency. Though 
there are various strategies to ending a conflict, states can end conflicts relatively 
peacefully with a political approach. 
In the insurgencies described, many scholars argue that Peru’s Shining Path will 
re-emerge, as it is still functional. They argue that financial support from the illegal drug 
trade will allow the SL to re-emerge. Similarly, some scholars are skeptical about 
CPN(M)’s shift to political cooptation. They argue that the CPN(M)’s move was a 
calculated one to consolidate power only. They foresee Nepal’s peace settlement of 2006 
as unable to lead to lasting peace since CPN(M) is hungry for power. Whether the SL 
will re-emerge, or CPN(M)’s move was a genuine step towards peace or a calculated 
move to consolidate power, only history will tell us.  
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